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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) asked the National Center for 
Transit Research (NCTR) at the University of South Florida to investigate the 
reasons behind the rising costs in insurance and bonding for major transit 
construction projects and identify ways that transit agencies could minimize these 
costs in their major capital programs.  Researchers defined major transit capital 
projects as those projects primarily involving rail, bus rapid transit systems or 
projects of similar complexity and/or cost.   
 
Florida is positioned to embark on a number of major transit construction projects 
over the next five years.  As transit’s primary funding source for capital programs, 
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) expressed concern about escalating 
construction costs, specifically in the areas of insurance and bonding.  
 
Researchers were required not only to test the premise that costs for insurance 
and bonding were increasing but also to identify the basis of the increase, if the 
premise was confirmed.  Researchers attempted to determine whether the costs 
associated with insurance and bonding for major transit construction projects 
were increasing disproportionately to overall construction costs. 
 
A thorough review of available literature on the subject was conducted to identify 
articles written on the subject in the areas of insurance and bonding expenses 
associated with major transit construction projects. In order to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the issues, the literature review included 
research related to why transit agencies need to seek alternative avenues of 
funding and an overview of some of the long-term and short-term approaches to 
debt financing, eight case studies that illustrated the rising costs associated with 
major capital construction projects, the identified drivers behind the rising costs, 
and possible ways to reduce costs.  
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ii 
To ensure adequate representation of Florida-based transit agencies, five Florida 
agencies and the Miami International Airport (due to a large portfolio of capital 
intensive construction projects) were included in the target participant roster.  A 
Leadership APTA listserve request was generated to promote the interest of 
transit agencies nationwide to participate in the research project. 
 
An interview tool was developed to assist researchers in the survey task, and 
researchers gained perspectives and garnered information through direct 
contacts with those who had a vested interest in major capital transit 
construction, including transit agency representatives, insurance and bonding 
associations and other stakeholders from private and professional transportation-
related organizations. Only 21 of the 34 identified stakeholders participated in the 
in-depth interviews.   
 
If sufficient interest was found, researchers were to organize a roundtable 
discussion.  The need for and benefits of having a roundtable discussion to 
strengthen the interview findings and verify further the implications of the 
literature review were weighed. One of the primary goals of conducting a 
roundtable was to promote dialogue between a diverse mix of those with a 
vested interest in major transit construction projects.  While steps to organize a 
roundtable were initiated, insufficient stakeholder interest across the sectors 
along with severe scheduling restraints nullified the researchers’ capacity to 
conduct a meaningful roundtable discussion.  
 
In general, researchers found that although there have been increases in the 
cost of risk insurances associated with major capital construction projects, the 
primary drivers in the escalation of overall increases in costs associated with 
major capital construction projects were related to: labor, concrete, steel, fuel, 
real estate acquisition, bid and construction delays, as well as other factors not 
associated with risk insurance. 
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Following is a summary of recommended actions to assist transit agencies in 
minimizing insurance costs: 
 
Currently, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2005 (TRIA) is mandated to 
sunset on December 31, 2007. Given the ongoing threats of terrorist attacks, it is 
important for transit agencies to understand how the determination of TRIA could 
affect them and how they should begin to prepare for such a decision.  
Recommendation:  provide agencies with status reports focused on 
developments related to the sunset of TRIA.  In the event the forecast for 
upholding the current legislation is favorable, begin to identify options available to 
transit agencies for the continuation of affordable terrorism insurance coverage 
with assistance from the appropriate organizations (including the risk insurance 
industry).  Findings must be communicated to agencies well before the projected 
sunset date. 
 
Although Florida transit agencies did not perceive that increases in the costs 
related to bonding and insurance for major transit construction projects were 
driving the overall increases, the state is experiencing critical problems related to 
the cost and availability of commercial property and liability insurances.  
Increases in costs and the lack of industry capacity to write new policies are 
challenges to transit agencies.  Recommendations:  assist transit agencies in 
exploring options for reducing costs through the evaluation and assessment of 
benefits and challenges associated with pooling agencies in an effort to reduce 
premiums; establish criteria for participation in transit insurance pools that would 
help lead to the establishment and sustainability of functional transit insurance 
pools; and provide other needed assistance leading to the implementation and 
ongoing effective management of Florida-based transit insurance pools. 
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The release of bids with cost estimates that are based on estimates 
projected at the time of bid preparation rather than on present-day cost 
estimates coupled with bid inflation due to anticipated time lost in the 
bureaucratic bid process were identified as problems associated with working 
with the public sector on major construction projects.  Recommendation:  create 
a partnership between FDOT and Florida-based agencies to isolate specific 
problems and identify better mechanisms for releasing bids that incorporate 
current cost estimates based on present-day projections.  Consider using 
roundtable discussions involving participants from the public and private sectors 
to establish rapport and identify ways to reduce frustration and bureaucratic-
based challenges, as well as to identify private sector misconceptions and private 
sector induced challenges and frustrations.  
 
Several respondents commented on the difficulty of meeting the FTA 
requirement to have 100 percent of bonding in place prior to project 
implementation, which is especially challenging when developing and 
implementing major capital intensive construction projects.  Recommendation:  
survey transit agencies to determine the extent of this problem and the 
mechanisms previously employed to circumvent this challenge.  Investigate the 
rationale behind the FTA requirement and explore bonding requirements for non-
transit capital intensive construction projects.  Identify reasonable and viable 
suggestions for revision to current FTA requirements through transit 
organizations and with assistance from and support of the surety industry.  
 
Although the findings of the research indicated that the increases in the costs 
related to insurance and bonding for major transit construction project were 
proportionate to the overall increases in the costs of these projects, there was 
recognition that increases associated with risk insurance impact the bottom 
line. To achieve a better understanding of the trends related to costs and the 
challenges of finding insurance companies willing to cover new projects, at least 
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five respondents suggested separating the issues of bonding and insurance.  
The respondents suggested not only evaluating them independently from each 
other but also evaluating them independently as cost drivers to escalating costs 
of major capital construction projects.  Recommendation:  develop and conduct 
independent research projects geared to each component of the risk insurance 
industry involved with major transit construction projects. Obtain feedback from 
transit agencies, risk industry representatives and others with vested interest in 
major capital construction projects for suggestions related to the design, 
objectives and scope of the projects.  With assistance from FTA and FDOT, 
identify several transit agencies willing to participate in the research projects by 
tracking costs related to insurance and bonding.  Since projects are generally 
several years in duration, initial findings could be developed with ongoing 
submissions, updated and tracked as projects progress. 
 
The Dulles Metro Project is the largest transportation project the Commonwealth 
of Virginia has ever undertaken and the third most costly rail proposal in the 
country.  The project utilizes a competitive/negotiated process, which differs 
from the standard design-built bid.  If costs run higher than anticipated during the 
project, the state and the private sector company share the risk. In order to 
accommodate funding cycles and insurance requirements, the project has been 
segmented into two phases. It is the Commonwealths’ first experience of 
constructing a non-road project under the state’s Public/Private Transportation 
Act.  Recommendation:  ongoing communication and status reports related to 
Dulles Metro Project could provide other agencies with real-time experiences of 
one of the largest transit construction projects to be undertaken in the country.  
At a time when there is considerable concern about revenue streams for transit 
construction, the promotion of the private sector investment in transit projects 
provides an additional alternative.  The use of a shared risk approach between 
the public and private sectors could help other agencies determine if true cost 
savings could be gained using a similar approach. 
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Consideration of how to reduce costs in creative and innovative ways is 
critical given the decrease in federal funding for transit construction; competition 
of other public-serving departments for state and local funds; the need to comply 
with several federal programs that require additional expenditures; costly 
maintenance of existing transit systems; and replacement of rolling stock.  
Recommendation:  joining forces with a university-based transportation 
research facility that can bring the resources of a business school, an 
engineering school and their own economic analysis and evaluation skills to the 
table could help FDOT and/or FTA in the identification and design of creative but 
viable approaches to cost reductions. The collaborative effort could explore 
known cost reduction methods, such as indexing bids to be agreed upon, clearly 
established values for labor and/or materials and set-points that determine who 
pays for what and when.  Exploration of such methods could lead to variations of 
the indexing model, the development of new models to reduce specific costs, or 
a combination of costs related to major construction projects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
To meet the nation’s transportation needs, many states and localities are 
planning or building expensive mass transit projects to replace aging 
infrastructure or to build new capacity.  These transit projects present major 
challenges to state and local transportation officials.  The projects can be 
technically challenging to construct and require their sponsors to resolve a wide 
range of social, environmental, land-use, and economic issues before and during 
construction.  They are costly and require significant commitments of public 
resources, which may take several years to obtain from federal, state, and local 
sources. 
 
The federal government provides funds to states and cities for capital 
improvements for highway and transit systems, while the states and cities cover 
most of the costs associated with operating the highway and transit systems.  
Over the past 10 years, the federal share of annual capital investment by all 
levels of government in highways has averaged 42 percent.  Total capital funding 
for transit has increased from the period prior to the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) through the end of the 20th century 
(see Figure 1 and Figure 2 for details).  Between 1990 and 2000, total capital 
funding for transit increased nearly 95 percent, from $4.9 billion in 1990 to $9.6 
billion in 2000. 
 
According to information available from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 
and the American Association of Public Transportation (APTA), directly 
generated funds (funds generated by transit operations, including directly levied 
taxes and tolls) were responsible for a significant portion of this increase with 
their value increasing from $200 million in 1990 to $2.6 billion in 2000.  In 1990, 
the federal government provided $2.9 billion in capital assistance, nearly 60 
percent of the total.  By 2000, this figure increased by 57 percent to $4.5 billion, 
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representing only 47 percent of total capital funding.  State assistance for transit 
rose from nearly $0.7 billion in 1990 to $1.0 billion by 2000, an increase of 48 
percent. 
 
Local assistance (not including directly generated funds) rose modestly until 
2000.  The composition of capital funding varies across transit systems in relation 
to the size of the system.  Measured by population, smaller systems depend 
more heavily on federal and state financial support, while larger system are able 
to generate a greater percentage of their capital funding from system operations 
or directly-generated taxes. 
 
Table 1-1 Funding by Source for Capital Transit Investments  
for the Decade 1990-2000 
 
Percent
Change
(1990-
2000)
Federal $2.9 $2.8 $2.7 $2.4 $2.6 $3.4 $3.6 $4.3 $3.9 $4.0 $4.5 57%
State 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 48%
Local 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.5 25%
Directly Generated 0.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.9 1.6 1.6 2.0 3.0 2.6 1253%
Total $4.9 $5.6 $5.4 $5.8 $5.8 $7.2 $7.1 $7.8 $7.9 $9.0 $9.6 94%
Funding Source 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 
 
Funding by Source - 2000
State
Assistance
11%
Federal
Assistance
47%
Local
Assistance
15%
Directly
Generated
27%
 
Figure 1-1 Percentage Breakdown of Capital Transit Investment  
by Funding Agencies for Year 2000 
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Why Do Transit Agencies Have to Look for Alternative Means of 
Funding? 
Despite the significant increase in federal and state funding for transit capital 
projects, transit agencies face a significant gap between needed investments and 
available resources. 
 
• Existing systems are in need of major repair and replacement of existing 
rolling stock and other assets.  Rapidly growing communities need to 
expand services and bring new services online.  These activities require 
additional funding. 
• In addition, compliance with several federal programs requires additional 
expenditures.  Compliance with Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
requires rolling stock and station upgrades to accommodate customers 
with disabilities, and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 require agencies to replace existing fleets with 
less polluting vehicles. 
• Federal grants for new projects termed “New Starts” are shrinking as a 
percentage of total capital.  Typically, the government provides 80 percent 
of total capital funding required for selected projects.  With a move to 
reduce this to 50 percent, transit agencies have a need to look for 
alternative funding sources. 
• Ever increasing costs of raw materials, labor and design mean that the 
costs will only continue to escalate. 
• Fare box recovery has remained at 40 percent, and offers limited potential 
for increase, which requires transit agencies to look for other revenue 
sources to support themselves. 
• In an increasingly competitive market, where transit is forced to compete 
with other public-serving departments, such as health and education for a 
share of grants, resources are scarce. 
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Transit agencies need to look to other sources of revenue in order to remain 
competitive and offer reasonable service to the customers.  Utilizing private 
partners (Public Private Partnership) to raise funds has been mooted as a 
possible solution with floating bonds to raise money for projects being the most 
common option in recent times. 
 
Although transit agencies of all sizes have participated in the capital markets, a 
small number of major transit agencies are responsible for the vast majority of 
transit-related debt financing today.  In contrast to the “major players,” i.e., the 
new Light Rail (LRT) systems, most transit agencies, particularly bus-only 
systems, have depended primarily on federal and state grants and lease funding 
arrangements for their capital programs.  Figure 3 presents a summary of mass 
transportation bond issues from 1997 through 2001. 
 
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
$ 
B
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Mass Transportation Bond Issues, 1997-2000 ($Billions)
New Money Refunding  
Figure 1-2 Mass Transportation Bond Issues, 1997-2001 
 
The next section deals with bonds that are commonly used by transit agencies to 
fund their projects.   
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BOND FINANCING 
 
Bonds are debt mechanisms backed by: 
 
• Dedicated local and state revenues, i.e., sales taxes; 
• General obligation pledges of taxing power; 
• Pledges of federal and other grant funds; or, 
• System revenues (e.g., fare box and ancillary revenues). 
 
Bonds can be used as finance mechanisms to support long-term and short-term 
infrastructure projects.  In order to be truly effective at meeting ongoing 
transportation needs, funding measures should provide funding not only for the 
initial construction of the facility, but also for its long-term maintenance and 
continued operation.  While this may seem obvious, states and regions are often 
tempted to raise short-term capital for the construction of infrastructure projects 
without consideration of the long-term operations and maintenance costs.  New 
Mexico, for example, has been forced to divert federal and state funds away from 
its maintenance program to pay the debt service incurred during its recent road-
building program (Evaluating Local Transportation Funding Measures).  Care 
must be taken to choose a good debt scheme for improving transit.  While the 
process of selecting a viable bond mechanism is beyond the scope of this 
review, a detailed analysis of different debt schemes available to transit agencies 
is outlined through the following series of the steps involved in the process. 
 
The following 12 steps (while presented in sequential order, these activities 
actually occur concurrently with some important feedback loops throughout the 
process) constitute the development and the implementation of a debt-financing 
mechanism: 
 
1. Select revenues to pledge for debt service 
2. Choose the type of debt to issue 
 
Finding Ways to Reduce Insurance and Bonding Costs 
Final Report, September  2006_________________________________ 
 
 
USF Center for Urban Transportation Research  6
3. Secure the necessary authorizations and approvals 
4. Decide upon the use of financial advisors 
5. Choose the form of the issue – whether competitive or negotiated 
6. Choose the type of security to issue 
7. Select the finance team 
8. Prepare the financing documents 
9. Develop a rating strategy and decide whether to use a credit 
enhancement vehicle 
10. Pre-market the bonds 
11. Price the bonds 
12. Close the transaction 
 
While this is the natural order of selecting a debt mechanism, the crucial steps 
are the earliest ones as they initialize funding and debt repayment mechanisms. 
 
Transit capital projects may require financing either for a long term or for 
relatively short periods.  Based on the duration, bond financing can be used to 
attain different goals. 
 
• Long-term debt financing allows transit agencies to develop projects faster 
than under a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) approach (Pay-as-you-go funding 
requires governments to pay for infrastructure costs directly from current 
revenues.  Revenue sources commonly used include taxes, fees, user 
charges, grants, and interest earnings.) by improving short-term cash flow 
and matching project funding with the useful life of assets.  Faster project 
delivery can, in some instances, strengthen revenue generation through 
increased ridership and reduce maintenance costs by retiring older, less 
reliable equipment. 
• Short-term debt-financing mechanisms are available to transit agencies to 
bridge a gap between a desired acquisition or construction start date and 
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the availability of permanent financing or grant and other pay-as-you-go 
funding sources. 
 
Long Term Bonds 
There are currently three types of bonds used to varying degrees by transit 
agencies.  Listed in their general order of prevalence in financing transit capital 
investments, the bond types are as follows: 
 
• Limited recourse bonds backed by dedicated or appropriated revenues 
other than those resulting directly from system operations, including state 
or local dedicated sales taxes, motor fuel taxes, property taxes, and 
pledges of future federal or other grant funds; 
• Bonds supported by a general promissory pledge of system revenues 
(e.g., fare box revenues, advertising, etc.); and, 
• Bonds supported by a general obligation full faith and credit pledge of 
supporting state or local governments. 
Limited recourse and special tax bonds 
These bonds are payable from a pledge of the proceeds against a specific tax.  
This tax could be a gasoline tax, a special assessment, incremental sales tax or 
property tax levied at a fixed price.  Unlike general obligation bonds, which have 
unlimited ability to raise taxes, these bonds are limited by the source for the 
revenue to pay the bonds.  There is, in particular, no promise of accessing the 
general taxing authority of the sponsoring jurisdiction for repayment. 
 
Sales tax revenue bonds, for example, have been issued by several California 
transportation authorities and transit districts.  The sales tax bonds differ from 
most transportation financings because the debt is paid from sales taxes and not 
from transportation revenues.  This type of financing sometimes requires special 
enabling legislation to facilitate the direct disbursement of tax revenues from the 
tax collecting entity to the trustee of the bond issuance to perfect the pledge of 
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those tax revenues and to ensure higher credit ratings.  There are two categories 
of limited recourse non-system revenue bonds – those backed by specific state 
and local tax revenues and those backed by anticipated federal and other grant 
funds. 
 
Bonds backed by federal or state grants are commonly referred to as “grant 
anticipation notes” (GAN).  GANs are similar to bonds backed by dedicated non-
system local and state revenues, but instead of state and local tax revenues, 
they are backed by intergovernmental grants.  Even though use of the term 
“notes” suggests relatively short-term issuances, GANs are being issued on a 
longer-term basis than most notes (although not as long as traditional bonds).  A 
$500 million issue of grant anticipation bonds was used to help connect San 
Francisco to the airport.  The bonds were used to finance or refinance a portion 
of the $1.48 billion San Francisco International Airport extension project, and the 
Association of Bay Area Governments (BART) was used as the conduit issuer.  
The bonds were backed by the federal government’s $750 million Full Funding 
Grant Agreement (FFGA) and the ability to issue sales tax bonds. 
 
With formula funding–backed financing, transit agencies may use formula 
funding as a source of repayment for GANs.  This does not provide a promise 
from the federal government for the delivery of those funds, nor a guarantee of 
the outstanding debt; however, with the guaranteed funding provisions of TEA-
21, there is a greater certainty as to aggregate funding levels.  Funds that can be 
used as a source of repayment are the same funds that can be used to pay for 
capital projects on a PAYGO basis, with the same requirements and restrictions 
as to use. 
 
In the case of Full Funding Grant Agreements-backed Financing, an FFGA is a 
multi-year federal funding arrangement under which FTA spreads its grant 
commitment over a 6- to 10-year or longer time period to reduce the annual 
burden of funding large capital projects.  FTA’s funding schedule is not an 
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irrevocable pledge, but rather a best efforts target, subject to annual 
appropriations by Congress.  In recent years, FFGA grantees have begun 
borrowing against their grants receivable to monetize the proceeds to meet 
construction requirements. 
Revenue bonds 
Revenue bonds are used to finance municipal projects that generate revenue 
(e.g., leasing a fleet of buses).  This revenue is used to make interest and 
principal payments to the bond holders.  Often, states and their sub-divisions 
create certain agencies and authorities to perform specific tasks.  Many times, 
the agency or authority has the ability to levy charges and fees for its services.  
TEA-21 allows transit operators to issue bonds secured with transit system 
revenues.  The proceeds from the sale of bonds may be used as a part of local 
matching funds for a transit capital project.  This increases flexibility and local 
funding for these projects. 
 
Fare box revenue bonds are usually issued by transit agencies.  These are 
secured by a pledge of the revenues collected by the operation of the transit 
system.  Fare box revenue bonds are rare due to the simple fact that most transit 
systems operate at substantial deficits.  Transit riders on average pay less than 
40 percent of transit operating costs.  Federal, state, and local subsidies are 
necessary to maintain operations.  Large metropolitan systems with well 
developed routes and consistent ridership levels are most appropriate for fare 
box revenue borrowing.  Even with such a transit system, other dedicated 
subsidy sources such as sales taxes or bridge tolls may be essential to obtain an 
investment grade rating on the debt instrument. 
General obligation bonds 
General obligation bonds are issued for municipal projects that do not generate 
revenue (such as a government office building).  These bonds are backed by the 
full faith and credit of the issuer.  Many bonds issues by states, cities, or county 
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districts also have the added security that issuers can raise property taxes to 
ensure payment.  This guarantee is of an unlimited nature.  The issuer can raise 
taxes as high as they want to pay the bonds.  If the property tax is not paid, the 
property can be sold at auction, giving the bond holder a superior claim above 
mortgages, mechanical liens, and other encumbrances. 
Short-Term Bonds 
A variety of short-term debt-financing mechanisms are available to transit 
agencies.  These financing mechanisms are generally deployed to bridge a gap 
between the desired acquisition or construction start date and the availability of 
permanent financing or grant and other PAYGO funding sources.  Short-term 
debt mechanisms include: tax and revenue anticipation notes, grant anticipation 
notes, and bond anticipation notes. 
Tax anticipation notes (TRANs) 
Tax and revenue anticipation notes are issued in anticipation of future tax 
receipts and other anticipated revenues.  They are generally issued as general 
obligation securities and used to meet operating costs prior to the availability of 
tax revenue sources.  This gap often occurs because taxes are collected on a 
periodic rather than on an ongoing basis. 
Bond anticipation notes (BANs) 
These instruments are issued to obtain financing for projects that will ultimately 
be financed through the sale of long-term bonds for cases in which that long-term 
issuance takes place at a later date.  This can be due to a number of factors, 
including legal limitations on debt issuance, market timing considerations 
(including prevailing interest rates), or the desire to pool the financing of a 
particular project with other projects that are not yet ready to go to the market. 
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Other Funding Opportunities 
Leveraging market access 
Smaller agencies seeking debt finance are discovering opportunities to partner 
for greater leverage in the markets.  State and local agencies are taking steps to 
support such pooling.  There are, of course, challenges to partnering, including 
limiting tax laws, financial liability concerns, and timing issues. 
State revolving funds and state infrastructure banks 
State operating revolving funds are an obvious way to help transit agencies 
secure capital funding for smaller agencies on a pooled basis, while also taking 
advantage of the greater leveraging power of the state.  Revolving loan funds 
have been in use for some time to meet a wide range of infrastructure needs, but 
they are only now being applied to transit investments and do face some 
limitations. 
Alternative revenue source 
Transit sponsors are experimenting with alternative revenue sources that go 
beyond traditional fare box and ancillary revenue sources.  Some sponsors, for 
instance, have discovered the potential application of tax increment financing for 
transit investment.  While the direct link between development and transit makes 
a strong argument for the imposition of fees to support transit, cities typically 
control tax increment financing programs and have not been willing to give up 
control. 
Multi-modal planning and funding 
Some agencies are discovering the advantages of multi-modal approaches for so 
called “mega-projects” that involve more than one mode of transportation.  
Through multi-modal approaches, transit can be incorporated into a larger project 
with other potential revenue sources, such as toll or surcharges and can benefit 
from legislative initiatives aimed at the entire project. 
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Public-private partnerships 
These are alternative ways for agencies to reduce their direct costs and 
involvement on projects using funds from private players.  Most of these 
measures have often been associated with capital highway projects rather than 
with transit projects.  Public-private partnerships may be structured in a variety of 
ways. 
 
1. Mixed-funding mechanisms, i.e., involving the participation of both public 
and private capital 
2. Concessions, i.e., infrastructure leased for a fixed period to a private 
organization, which manages it on a commercial basis 
3. Build, Own, Operate (BOO) mechanisms, i.e., a private organization 
finances and builds infrastructure, which is owned, tolled and operated for 
an unlimited time 
4. Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) mechanisms, i.e., a concession awarded 
to a private organization to finance, build, and operate the tolled 
infrastructure during a limited period 
 
The next section provides case studies of recent transit projects, primarily heavy 
and light rail projects, for which transit agencies have experienced major cost 
overruns. 
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RISING PROJECT COSTS 
 
With improved financing techniques available to transit agencies, it is expected 
that the costs will be well planned and, subsequently, well managed.  
Nonetheless, many agencies have reported rising costs along with delayed 
opening dates.  Some of the major transit projects in the recent past are 
discussed in this section.  
 
Cost estimates are used for different purposes at different stages of a transit 
project.  During the planning stage, cost estimates are used to determine project 
feasibility and to compare alternate transit modes or alignments during the 
environmental process, i.e., the “alternatives analysis” process.  During the 
preliminary engineering phase, cost estimates are used to refine alignment 
configurations and establish construction budgets.  During final engineering, cost 
estimates are used to refine budgets and evaluate the responsiveness of 
construction contract bids.  At any of these stages, cost estimations can be 
inaccurate and affect overall cost and skew the projected costs. 
 
A rather extensive study completed in 2003 (Flyvbjerg et al.) reviewed 258 
projects completed from 1927-1998 in 20 nations on 5 continents worth $90 
billion in constant 1995 prices.  The study showed with overwhelming statistical 
significance that, in terms of costs, transport infrastructure projects did not 
perform as projected regardless of the type of project, geographic region or time 
period.  Cost escalation was the rule rather than the exception with cost 
escalation of rail projects at 45 percent, tunnels and bridges at 34 percent, and 
roads at 20 percent.  Cost performance did not improve over time, and cost 
estimates were as inaccurate and cost escalation as large as before, even after 
the new role of the public in transport infrastructure decision-making.  
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Flyvbjerg et al. concluded that cost underestimation is used strategically to make 
projects appear under-inflated to gain approval from decision-makers to build, 
and such behavior explains why cost escalations are so consistent over project 
type, region, and time.  The misleading cost estimates move risk-taking to a 
different level by masking the true nature of the risk that insurance companies 
and professional investors are taking.   
 
In a follow-up study, Flyvbjerg et al. outlined the following problems associated 
with planning for large infrastructure projects: 
• Large projects are inherently risky due to long planning horizons and 
complex interfaces; 
• Technology is often not standard; 
• Decision-making and planning are often multi-actor processes with 
conflicting interests; 
• Project scope or ambition level will change significantly over time; 
• Statistical evidence shows that unplanned events are often unaccounted 
for; 
• Budget contingencies are sorely inadequate; and, 
• Misinformation about costs, benefits, and risks is the norm and results in 
cost overruns and/or benefit shortfalls with a majority of projects. 
 
Transit agencies have come under intense scrutiny for failing to keep their costs 
under control.  Some of the major reasons for high costs are discussed, and 
specific projects that fall under those specific reasons are cited as case 
examples.  The key reasons for the cost increases include: 
 
1) Higher-than-anticipated contract costs; 
2) Schedule delays; 
3) Project scope changes and system enhancements; 
4) Increasing insurance costs; and, 
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5) Unexpected/unusual circumstances unique to each project. 
 
While it is virtually impossible to assign the increase in cost of a project to one 
specific reason, a mixture of conditions can be used to explain the cost 
increases.  Some recent capital transit projects are discussed below along with 
the reasons for the reported cost increases. 
South Boston Piers Transitway 
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) constructed an 
underground transitway connecting its existing transit system with the South 
Boston Piers area.  The first phase of the South Boston Piers transitway project 
was a one-mile, three-station bus tunnel between South Station and Boston’s 
World Trade Center.  In 1994, the Full Funding Grant Agreement in the amount 
of $413 million was approved, which agreed to provide $331 million in New Starts 
funds to the project.  In 1999, the project was estimated to cost $601 million, a 46 
percent increase of $188 million.  The transitway was opened to service in 
December 2004, four years later than originally projected. 
 
The project saw massive increases in costs along the way, even before actual 
implementation started.  In order to address the cost increases and the schedule 
delays, MBTA submitted a “recovery plan” to FTA in January 1999.  In the plan, 
MBTA agreed to pay for the changes that had occurred after the grant agreement 
was signed.  Under the capital plan submitted by MBTA to FTA in October 1999, 
the $331 New Starts funds remained constant.  MBTA planned to use $150 
million in federal transit formula funds and $120 million in state bond funds to 
finance the remaining costs of the project.  The budget was also amended to 
include $40 million for project and construction contingencies for future change 
orders. 
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The project management oversight contractor, the FTA, and MBTA attributed the 
project’s costs increases to schedule delays and design modifications that 
occurred after initial costs estimates.  Other cost increasing issues included: 
 
• Potentially higher-than-anticipated contract costs to construct the last 
major segment of the transitway tunnel; 
• The delay associated with deciding whether to build a new vehicle 
maintenance facility or expanding the existing facility; 
• A local agency’s participation in raising capital for eight vehicles, which 
increased working time frames; and, 
• A higher-than-anticipated unit cost for the vehicles. 
BART Project 
The Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) project was an 8.7-mile, four-station 
extension to its existing rail system to provide service to the San Francisco 
International Airport.  As of January 2000, the project costs were estimated at 
$1.483 billion—$316.2 million (or 27 percent) above the $1.167 billion estimated 
in the grant agreement. 
  
In order to reflect the project’s cost increases and new financial arrangements, 
BART submitted a new finance plan to FTA in November 1999 and applied for a 
grant agreement amendment on January 21, 2000.  The finance plan identified 
sufficient funds to pay the current $1.483 billion estimated cost to complete the 
airport extension.  Under the proposed plan, the federal contribution was $750 
million (or 51 percent of the total cost).  The remaining $733 million was to be 
financed by a combination of state and local funding sources.  The state of 
California provided $152 million.  Local funding sources provided the remaining 
$581 million— BART ($181.7 million), San Francisco International Airport ($200 
million), San Mateo County Transit District ($171 million), the Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission ($26.5 million), and San Mateo County Flood Control 
District ($2 million).  BART had agreements in place to secure all of the funds. 
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According to the funding schedule in the grant agreement, BART would receive 
all of the federal funds committed to the project several years after project 
completion.  As a result, cash-flow shortfalls were expected to occur during the 
course of the project.  In order to cover this shortfall, BART obtained a $300 
million letter of credit secured by future federal appropriations.  Furthermore, to 
account for these shortfalls in its plan, BART revised the total project’s financing 
costs to $42.6 million, an increase of $18.6 million over the original amount. 
BART also allocated an additional $17.9 million in its proposed plan as a 
contingency for higher-than- anticipated financing costs. 
  
BART officials attributed increased project costs to a variety of reasons.  These 
included: 
   
• An increase of $155 million due to higher-than-expected construction bids; 
• Higher-than-expected costs for right-of-way, utility relocation, 
unanticipated mitigations; and, 
• Third-party contracts for such things as engineering services; and, 
construction oversight, which required redesign of certain parts of the 
transitway. 
San Juan/Tren Urbano Rapid Rail Line 
The San Juan/Tren Urbano Rapid Rail Line is a 10.7-mile, 16-station rapid rail 
line to serve existing and projected development in the San Juan metropolitan 
area.  The line is expected to carry 113,300 riders a day in 2010.  This project is 
one of FTA's "turnkey" demonstration projects, which incorporates contracts to 
design, build, operate, and maintain the system. 
 
During 1996 and 1997, seven design-build contracts were awarded for different 
segments of the project.  The grant agreement committed about $307 million in 
New Starts funds for the project, which was estimated to cost $1.25 billion.  In 
January 2000, the project cost was expected to increase to about $1.7 billion—
$426 million (or 34 percent) higher than the original estimate. 
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A revised agreement was reached on July 19, 1999.  Under the revised 
agreement, the amount of New Starts funds remained the same—$307 million 
(or 18 percent of the cost).  The amendment accounted for the project’s scope 
changes, cost increases, and planned use of FTA transit formula ($141 million) 
and federal highway ($260 million) funds for the project. 
 
Under the project’s revised finance plan, $962 million in local funding would go to 
the project, including $300 million to repay a federal loan over 35 years.  Local 
funding sources included the proceeds of gasoline taxes, diesel taxes, motor 
vehicle license fees, highway tolls, and investment earnings on bond proceeds, 
and petroleum taxes that had been committed by the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico.  The Tren Urbano receives substantial annual funding from its dedicated 
local funding sources, and from 1993 through 1997, the average revenue from 
these sources was about $270 million a year.  In 1998, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico committed an additional $120 million to its annual base from 
petroleum tax revenues.  Some of the primary reasons for cost growth are as 
follows: 
 
• The primary reason for cost growth was a change in the scope of the 
project.  Approximately two years elapsed between the preparation of the 
original estimate used in the grant agreement and the award of all the 
design-build contracts. During this period, the Tren Urbano changed and 
refined the project’s design by adding two stations and 10 rail cars and 
made numerous alignment changes and station enhancements.  The 
contract awards were $172 million higher than the original estimate.  After 
the contracts were awarded, an additional $158 million was approved for 
enhancements and scope changes for items such as systems work for the 
added stations, an enhanced fare collection system, and additional 
construction management services.  
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• Costs increased by $52 million (four percent of the original estimate) to 
cover change orders or unforeseen work not related to scope changes. 
Approximately $44 million for contingencies remains in the budget to cover 
future claims or additional changes. 
• A number of contractor issues also affected the project’s schedule and 
cost.  Some of the contractors had problems meeting agreed-upon 
construction milestones because of the lack of skilled labor and a variety 
of other reasons.  
Tacoma Narrows Bridge 
The construction of Tacoma Narrows in Washington State was affected by the 
September 11, 2001 incidents in New York City. The Washington State 
Department of Transportation signed a $615 million design-build contract for the 
bridge.  The financing was to be carried out using general obligation bonds. A 
total of $840 million was appropriated to finance the project.  The bridge is a 
5,400-foot suspension bridge across a neck of the Puget Sound between 
Tacoma, Washington and the Kitsap Peninsula. 
 
The construction, which was to have started in 2000, after innumerable delays, 
finally started in early 2002.  Renegotiations of the contract were carried out 
before the project finally got underway, but the insurance conditions had changed 
owing to the events of September 11, which occurred in the interim.  Major 
reasons for the escalations in costs included: 
 
• Insurance premiums jumped 49 percent, causing an increase of $14 
million for insurance and surety bonds. Coverage decreased as the 
premiums rose so high that the coverage for some risks had to be 
dropped. 
• Certain risks could not be insured using private agencies and the 
uncovered risk had to born by the public entities involved in the project. 
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• Higher deductibles and increased risks had to be born by the public 
entities leading to higher overall possible costs. 
• In the aftermath of the September 11, many private entities refused to take 
the risk for terrorism, forcing the public agencies to undertake more risk, 
thereby potentially increasing costs. 
Minneapolis Hiawatha Light Rail Transit Line 
The Minneapolis Hiawatha Light Rail Transit (LRT) line extends from downtown 
Minneapolis to the Mall of Americas through the Minneapolis–Saint Paul Airport. 
The line will be operated by Metro Transit, an operating division of the 
Metropolitan Council, the regional planning agency serving the Twin Cities’ 
seven-county metropolitan planning area.  Minnesota Department of 
Transportation (MnDOT) constructed the Hiawatha line on behalf of the Council. 
 
One of the unique challenges that faced the Hiawatha Project Office was the 
acquisition of federal property through the Fort Snelling military reservation.  In 
order to acquire the 1.5 miles of alignment through Fort Snelling, property 
exchange agreements were negotiated with five separate military services and 
federal agencies.  
 
When preliminary engineering for the project was initiated in 1999, an extension 
through the airport and a terminal station at the Mall of Americas was included. 
Construction of the line, begun in 2001, required the boring of two parallel 7,400-
foot tunnels underneath two active runways at the Minneapolis–Saint Paul 
International Airport and the excavation of an underground station at the main 
terminal.  Some of the difficulties involved with the project are enumerated below: 
• Attempting to acquire federal land introduced both schedule and financial 
risks to the project.   
• Each federal agency was different, with different personalities and 
different rules.   
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• Assigning a single individual to be the principle contact with the agency 
was essential to enable continuity and hasten the procedure. 
• The project was constructed primarily through a design-build (DB) contract 
with a joint venture called Minnesota Transit Constructors (MnTC), which 
includes Granite Construction, McCrossan Construction, Parsons 
Transportation Group, and Edwards and Kelcey.  One of the difficulties in 
the agreement was that even though the compensation was described in 
the property exchange agreement, each building, structure, parking lot, or 
roadway needed to be designed and a natural tendency evolved to 
continue to add elements to the scope. 
Salt Lake City/University Rail Line 
The Utah Transit Authority (UTA) planned its light rail system in 1990.  UTA’s first 
line, the 15-mile, 16-station North/South Line, runs at street level through Salt 
Lake Valley and into the southern suburbs.  The line would operate on city 
streets downtown (two miles) and then follow a lightly used railroad alignment 
owned by UTA to the suburban community of Sandy (13 miles).  The Full 
Funding Grant Agreement, signed on August 2, 1995, projected an opening date 
of December 31, 2000.  The completed cost of the line, which opened in 
December 1999, was approximately $20 million under the original $312.5 million 
estimated in the 1995 grant agreement. 
A UTA official attributed potential cost savings primarily to: 
 
• Favorable construction bids at the outset of the project; 
• Early procurement of vehicles already in production through another 
grantee; 
• Reduction of the project schedule by one year; and, 
• The fact that federal funds were provided in accordance with the funding 
schedule in the grant agreement. 
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UTA and FTA officials negotiated the allocation of unspent funds to 
improvements to the project’s existing scope.  For example, UTA hopes to widen 
some single-track bridges to double-track and to purchase additional vehicles to 
handle the increased traffic generated by special events.  The agencies also 
suggested amendment changes, which would authorize the use of surplus 
federal funds from the North-South grant agreement.  UTA proposed the 
construction of a new 2.5-mile light rail line extending from downtown Salt Lake 
City to the University of Utah—at a cost of $105.7 million, including a New Starts 
commitment of about $84.6 million (80 percent).  FTA officials stated that while 
executing the grant early was not likely, the agency allowed UTA to begin 
construction using local funds without jeopardizing its ability to obtain a grant 
agreement at a later date. 
Houston Regional Bus Plan 
Houston Metro’s $1.0 billion Regional Bus Plan consists of a variety of 
improvements to its existing bus system.  The package includes new and 
extended high-occupancy-vehicle (HOV) facilities and ramps, several transit 
centers and park-and-ride lots, bus acquisitions, bus service expansion, and 
supporting facilities.  The Full Funding Grant Agreement, signed on December 
30, 1994, covers only the federal component of the project.  As of May 1999, the 
projected opening date was December 31, 2005, or three years beyond the date 
specified in the grant agreement.  The grant amount of $500 million was 
supported by the federal government.  The grantees requested an increase in 
funding for the project owing to increased expenditures. 
 
The $53.5 million dollar increase in the federal component of the project was due 
primarily to a two-year delay resulting from local contractors’ challenging the 
constitutionality of Houston Metro’s Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program. 
In 1997, the program was held unconstitutional, and Metro appealed the 
decision.  While the federal component of the project has increased, the cost of 
the overall project has remained constant at $1.0 billion.  According to Houston 
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Metro, not meeting the funding schedule in the grant agreement did not affect the 
project or contribute to cost increases. 
Las Vegas Monorail Project 
The Las Vegas Monorail project began as a private enterprise to connect some 
of the major hotels in Las Vegas with the city center.  As time passed, the 
entrepreneurs tried to withdraw their investment in the project in favor of 
government agencies constructing the monorail using public funds, raised by 
issuing bonds. 
 
In 1997 a monorail company attorney said the project, as envisioned at the time, 
was going to cost $65 million.  The $650 million tax-free bond issue that was 
released later is slated to be the largest ever by the state of Nevada. Indeed, it is 
almost triple the total amount of bonds the state Department of Business & 
Industry has ever issued.  The contracts that were awarded were initially design-
build contracts. 
  
A “Design-Build-Equip” contract is now in place for the project.  This contract is 
with LVMC, Bombardier, and Granite.  Only $342.3 million of the $650 million 
total cost of the privately-funded 3.9 mile project is capital construction under this 
design/build/operate contract.  Under the fixed-price contract, the contractor must 
construct and install the monorail system. Approximately $141.6 million will be 
used to construct the fixed facilities (to be completed by Granite), $189.7 million 
will be used for the operating system (to be completed by Bombardier), and 
approximately $11.0 million is a utility allowance. Under the contract, there is a 
guaranteed completion date and performance guarantees from the parent 
companies of Bombardier and Granite. 
  
The balance of the cost is for bond interest, insurance premiums, extra 
contingencies, and reserves to allow the project-revenue bonds to achieve a 
triple “A” rating. In some respects, the inflated costs appear to have grown out of 
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its status as a government-linked project.  As the monorail company began 
seeking state approvals needed for the tax exempt bonds, the project began to 
increasingly approximate a public rather a private undertaking.  Its promoters, in 
public, continued to describe the project as a private monorail; however, they 
were actively encouraging state and local officials to amend laws to allow tax-
subsidized financing.   
 
Proponents have blamed the massive inflation of the project costs on the 
decision to meet federal standards for "transit grade" transportation, which would 
permit an eventual integration of the resort corridor's custom-built trains into a 
federally funded metro system and help with operating and maintenance costs. 
These actions escalated costs and turned the monorail into a highly expensive 
system.  The bonds were taken on the premise that high projected ridership 
numbers would make it a highly successful venture; however, independent 
reports suggest that such high projections are unusual in LRT in the US and may 
affect the repayment of the bonds. 
Cost Estimating for Underground Transit: A General Oversight 
Transit tunnel construction is complex, risky, and often fraught with geologic 
unknowns.  In urban areas, tunnel transit has a distinct advantage of minimizing 
surface disruptions compared to surface or cut-and-cover transit configurations. 
However, tunnel construction is an expensive endeavor. While social, political 
and environmental forces have favored tunnel alignments for many transit 
systems, the costs of construction have often exceeded budgets, preventing the 
development of new transit lines or the extension of existing systems and eroding 
the public’s confidence in the ability of tunneling projects to be accurately 
forecasted. 
 
Traditional construction cost estimating methods rely on historical cost data and 
are not well suited for underground transit feasibility studies not only because 
construction costs vary widely on specific projects, but also because such 
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construction costs are not generally available in cost databases. Furthermore, 
the inherently expensive and unknown nature of underground construction often 
leads to inaccurate cost estimates, which in turn can lead to a significant budget 
shortfall as the project moves from planning and design to construction. 
 
Transit agencies use various methods to reduce costs as discussed in the next 
section. 
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WHAT ARE POSSIBLE WAYS TO REDUCE COSTS? 
 
Some of the areas in which the transit agencies are working hard to improve their 
budget control are explained below.  
Construction and Design Contracts 
Contract awards play an important role in deciding the costs of the project. 
Choosing the contract best suited to the project on hand can reduce costs for the 
agency.  Most capital transit investments fall under three major types of 
contracting, which are explained below.  The merits of each kind of process are 
presented and possible cost issues associated with the contracts are discussed.  
The allocation of the contract ultimately influences other major costs, such as 
insurance and bond costs and repayments. 
Design-bid-build process 
The traditional contracting system involves a two-step process. The owner first 
contracts with an engineer or architect to prepare plans and specifications for a 
project and, then, contracts separately with a constructor to build the project in 
accordance with plans.  One of the major arguments, which made this form of 
contracting so popular, was that separating design and construction 
responsibilities reduced the ability of contractors and designers to commit fraud 
by using inadequate materials or unsatisfactory design or construction practices 
in an effort to save money (Tirolo, 1999).  
 
Referred to as the “design-bid-build” process, this type of contracting features a 
dominant role by the owner.  Much of the risk is held by the owner who drives the 
process in a series of sequential steps. The steps are stated below. 
 
• Project requirements - The owner determines project requirements, using 
information at his/her disposal and perhaps employs “experts” to help with 
project definition. This process, known as programming, yields sufficient 
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information for the owner to decide to proceed with the project and 
provides preliminary budget estimates. 
• Project financing - Determining the source of funding is handled by the 
owner.  In the case of public owners, there are usually several options that 
range from direct appropriations to revenue or general obligation bonds.  It 
is the owner’s responsibility to find and secure project funding. 
• Project design - Once the owner is ready to proceed, he/she goes through 
a selection process to select a designer.  This process is usually a 
credentials-based selection process with price for the designer’s services 
negotiated AFTER the designer has been selected. 
• The bid process - Once the design is completed, the owner goes through 
a publicly advertised, competitive bid process where the contract is 
awarded to the lowest bidder, determined to be a responsive and 
responsible contractor. 
• The build process - The lowest bidder executes the construction in 
accordance with plans and specifications, produced by the designer, but 
provided to the builder by the owner.  Upon completion, the builder 
transfers the facility to the owner, who assumes responsibility for the 
operation and maintenance of the facility. 
 
The contract award price is not a reliable indicator of the final cost to the owner 
for construction.  Contractor-initiated changes, claims, and bids are not obviously 
captured at the time of award.  Three contracts from Tri-County Metropolitan 
Transportation District of Oregon’s (TriMet) recently completed Westside-
Hillsboro light rail extension project illustrate the point.  First, on a $29 million 
low-bid contract to extend light rail in downtown Portland, Oregon, TriMet 
received a $13 million claim late in construction.  Second, on a $104 million low-
bid tunnel contract, costs increased $75 million.  Third, on an $8 million utility 
relocation low-bid contract, TriMet was forced to delete certain work from it and 
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issue a separate contract for approximately $2.5 million to accomplish the 
deleted work. 
 
Nonetheless, there have been success stories using the traditional means of 
procuring contracts.  On the issue of working within fixed timeframes, Texas 
Department of Transportation (TxDOT) had significant success within the 
traditional design-bid-build system by using “A+B” bidding or penalties/bonuses 
for contractors.  The Pierce Elevated Freeway reconstruction in Houston and the 
recent reconstruction of the Padre Island Causeway are two examples.  More 
recently, a turnpike project under construction in northern Travis and southern 
Williamson counties (MoPac extension/45 North) was significantly expedited 
through the use of contractor incentives. 
 
Owner concerns over budget, (schedule, public impacts, technical expertise or 
capacity, working relationships, or jurisdictional matters) have caused the 
evolution of a more complex method of granting the contract selected by the 
owners.  This method is called “Competitive Sealed Proposals.”  This method is 
similar to the traditional method, except the owner is free to negotiate price and 
services with the vendors, and selection can be based on a “best value” selection 
method which considers price and technical merit.  First, all those firms that meet 
a certain technological and proven track record are short listed.  These firms are 
then interviewed separately over other issues before awarding the contract.  The 
two-step low bid is intended to increase the likelihood that a contractor with a 
record of proven performance in similarly complex work is awarded the contract. 
 
For instance, the government code in Texas explains the principles that public 
entities must follow in procuring engineering and architectural (E/A) services. 
“The entity must first select the most highly qualified provider and attempt to 
negotiate a fair and reasonable price with the most highly qualified provider.  If a 
satisfactory contract cannot be negotiated with the most highly qualified provider, 
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the entity must end negotiations with that provider, select the next most qualified 
provider and attempt to negotiate a contract, continuing in order of rankings until 
a contract is successfully negotiated.”  
Design-build process 
The owner executes a single contract for both design and construction services.   
Selection of the design-build contractor is based upon evaluation criteria that are 
weighted by the owner.  The price of the project may be bid or negotiated.  This 
type of contract provides a single firm with the task of providing both the design 
and the fulfillment of the designated project, i.e., design-build provides single 
point accountability to the owner for design and construction.  Design-build 
procedures may very well expedite projects by allowing some overlap in the 
design and construction phases of a project. 
 
The best examples of design-build successes are projects that are especially 
time sensitive, such as the I-15 reconstruction in Salt Lake City, where the 2002 
Olympics imposed a significant deadline.  There are also examples of projects 
where the fast- tracking of projects has not occurred.  For example, initial efforts 
to use the design-build process in Texas on projects such as 45 SE in Austin and 
LBJ Freeway improvements in Dallas suggest that significant front-end time can 
be lost as owners attempt to develop a process and sort out risk allocation. 
Design-build procedures are unlikely to be cheaper and are especially unlikely to 
reduce an agency’s costs. 
Potential cost advantages include: 
• Owner lessens risk of contract award to a construction contractor who 
lacks the experience, expertise, or capacity to perform successfully. 
• Owner risk for designer-contractor cost issues is avoided. This is one of 
the major drawbacks of traditional design techniques.  
• Owner may fix a not-to-exceed price, based upon known scope. 
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• Design-build contractor has inherent incentive to consider constructible 
and value engineering opportunities during design. 
Design-build process also has its disadvantages: 
• The design-build exemption must be justified, evaluated in a public 
hearing, and approved by the entity having contract authority. 
• Owner does not directly control the final design, and may be disappointed 
with the final design product. 
• Great care should be taken in selection of a design-build contractor.  The 
owner generally does not control the selection of key subcontractors or 
designers, thereby increasing reliance upon the design-build contractor 
with regard to quality and performance. 
• Definition of the scope is critical.  A poorly defined or unsettled scope may 
result in significant cost increases or sacrifices in project quality or 
function. 
• Lack of checks and balances may expose the owner to shortcomings in 
design and construction. 
• The legal rights and obligations of the parties involved in these contracts 
may vary from traditional understandings and not be understood.  Special 
attention should be given to allocation of risks. 
 
One of the major concerns of the design industry about design-build is that as a 
business model, design-build potentially raises the costs of competing for work. 
In the traditional model, there is a cost associated with being selected by an 
owner, but rarely does the selection process involve significant pre-design of the 
project.  In a design-build process, however, from two to five firms may be 
required to essentially perform preliminary engineering, or in some cases, 
detailed design of a project.  For the unsuccessful proposers, this can be a 
significant cost.  That is why the industry has promoted the idea of stipends for 
unsuccessful proposers, even though stipends rarely cover the cost.   
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Construction Manager/General Contractor Procurement 
In the Construction Manager and General Contractor (CM/GC) procurement, final 
design is accomplished through the quality based selection (QBS) process and 
under separate contract to the owner.  During the design process, the 
construction contractor is selected based upon criteria that allow the owner to 
evaluate performance and price competition.  Bid price for construction work is 
not a selection criterion because the design is not complete.  The general 
contractor also performs construction management duties during design and 
construction, as defined by the owner.  The CM/GC is also at risk for the 
performance of the construction, following negotiation of an agreement with the 
owner for a guaranteed maximum price (GMP) based upon the defined scope of 
work. 
 
A CM/GC contract may include preconstruction services such as design reviews, 
value engineering, scheduling and staging of the work, pricing of construction 
options, hazardous materials planning, and quantity reconciliation.  The overall 
GMP for construction may consist of low bid work, value-based selection of 
subcontractors, or self-performed work by the CM/GC, as governed by applicable 
rules. 
Advantages 
• Owner retains QBS process for design and directly controls preliminary 
engineering and final design. 
• Owner lessens risk of contract award to a construction contractor who 
lacks the experience, expertise, or capacity to perform successfully. 
• The contractor at risk for construction is brought on board during design, 
providing assistance to the owner regarding value engineering, 
constructible efficiencies, scope clarity, design reviews, pricing, schedule, 
and budget control.  Early contractor involvement results in a better 
understanding of the contract, fairer risk allocation, and less risk of claims. 
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Competitive pricing is obtained and confirmed through “open book” cost 
reviews. 
• Prior to the start of construction, a GMP for construction is established, 
providing greater budget certainty for the owner.  The owner can 
significantly influence the contractor’s work plan as it relates to quality 
control, safety, schedule, and mitigation of impacts to the public. 
• Collaboration among owner, designer, jurisdictions, and contractor during 
design builds a team approach that is likely to carry through construction, 
thus helping in providing a better end product. 
 
The University of Texas System (UT System), a conglomerate of nine 
universities and six health institutions, is probably one of the more sophisticated 
owners.  UT System has experimented with design-build but seems to be moving 
to “CM-at risk” as its preferred delivery mechanism.  The main reason to choose 
such a method is the fact that the owner gets the benefit of designer-constructor 
synergy, but knows that the designer ultimately represents the owner. 
 
The TriMet in Oregon used CM-at risk contracting for one of its projects to 
construct a building to locate its light rail vehicles.  The reasons behind the 
decision were described: “Developing a construction staging approach that is 
compatible with service operations was essential.  Construction contractor input 
during design is essential in developing a realistic, cost effective, and executable 
construction staging plan.  TriMet operations demand that the contractor focus on 
the expansion work and get it done quickly, safely, and in accordance with TriMet 
track access procedures.  Having construction contractor input during design will 
increase the risk that the construction staging plan makes the plan realistic and 
cost effective according to the project managers.” 
 
Studying all available options for contracting and then choosing the most suitable 
one for the study can save transit agencies millions of dollars and also improve 
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other pertinent issues such as timeframe of completion, reliability and quality-
related matters. 
Federal Regulations 
It appears that federal performance bond regulations may have unintended 
consequences.  At the present time, federal rules require a 100 percent 
performance bond as insurance for every construction contract, which results in a 
transit contract being divided into smaller contracts to enable contractors to be 
bonded.  Bonding of multiple contractors increases the costs, as other aspects of 
large projects such as contract management and inter-project coordination 
become more complex.  A review and relaxation of the 100 percent requirement 
for the performance bond could minimize the problem and help contain at least 
some of the associated costs. 
Are estimates always accurate? 
When a new system is pursued, or a new mode of transit is introduced, costs are 
often estimated based on existing historical cost prices for similar projects.  
Dissimilar geographical, socioeconomic and political considerations in different 
regions cause skewing of the costs.  Expenses, which run higher than initial 
costs, can be mistakenly projected as rising costs, when they are, in fact, 
unavoidable price increases.  
Some ways to alleviate such false starts are listed below: 
 
1. Constructability and estimator experience with construction methods are 
paramount to the development of a realistic cost estimate.  
2. Production-type estimates that account for geography and geology of a 
project must be used to establish accurate budgets. 
3. On large, complex transit projects, contingencies that account for 
allocation of risk and market conditions must be incorporated into the cost 
estimate. 
 
Finding Ways to Reduce Insurance and Bonding Costs 
Final Report, September  2006_________________________________ 
 
 
USF Center for Urban Transportation Research  34
4. Construction cost estimates for projects that are either a new system or 
integrate a new mode must incorporate higher contingencies to account 
for unknown conditions. 
5. Cost estimates should always be reported in the year of estimation dollars. 
Previous cost estimates must be escalated as year of estimation dates 
shift during project development. 
6. Contingencies, escalation, year of estimation dates, and other cost 
estimating intricacies must be explained to the public.  Project budgets 
that are transparent to the public are less likely to go awry or be criticized. 
Insurance Issues 
Insurance costs are divided into two categories of investment projects: property 
insurance and liability insurance.  Property insurance depends on the magnitude 
and the size/cost of the project.  Liability involves the project complexities, 
specific designs, and the conditions prevalent for the site. 
 
While property insurance is proportional to the net final worth of the system 
developed, liability insurance can depend on the track record of the contractors, 
and transit agency and may include lower costs even for highly complex projects.  
A recent study found that while many agencies require contractors to purchase 
insurance bonds, obtaining bonds for large projects could be difficult.  According 
to the study, in the case of rail, “the bonding industry has shrunk and is hesitant 
to post bonds for rail cars because the industry has a reputation for problems and 
delays.  This affects the size of the contracts which can be offered and the pool 
of contractors eligible for each contract.” 
 
Some interesting aspects of insurance that have altered costs in a major way are 
discussed below. 
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Neo-traditional insurance policies 
Large construction projects are becoming more difficult to finance because of 
increasing costs, lack of control, and rising litigation.  Owners and contractors of 
these projects want innovative solutions to decrease the cost of construction, 
while making the project safer.  Under “wrap-up” insurance programs, project 
owners (such as state departments of transportation and transit agencies) 
purchase insurance to cover all the parties involved in a project—the owner, the 
construction manager, the general contractor, and the subcontractors.  This 
procedure has certain advantages: 
 
• Owner/contractor (whoever issues the insurance policy) pays the cost of 
the insurance on a direct basis, as opposed to paying indirectly through 
inclusion in the contractor's bids; 
• Contingency (e.g., inflation and rate increases) and profit loading applied 
by contractors to their actual insurance costs are avoided; 
• Duplication of premium costs where contractors and each of their 
subcontractors end up insuring the same cost elements can be avoided; 
• Bids with/without insurance costs as a bid line item can be examined; and, 
• Only the ultimate net cost of the insurance is paid; all premium discounts, 
economies of volume purchasing, and dividends for good experience flow 
directly to the owner. 
 
On the South Boston Piers transit-way project, the PMO contractor 
recommended that the grantee use “wrap-up” insurance rather than the 
traditional method of insuring the project under which all parties involved in the 
project would obtain insurance independently.  By selecting wrap-up insurance, 
the grantee was able to achieve an initial savings of $14.1 million and potential 
total savings of $21.1 million. 
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Post-September 11 
In the aftermath of the September 11 incidents in the U.S., insurance companies 
were unwilling to handle large transit projects due to their susceptibility to 
possible terrorist acts.  This increased the liability issues for public agencies, 
which had to serve as insurers for the transit projects. To reduce the impact on 
these agencies, the federal government proposed an act called the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002.  President Bush signed into law the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) on November 26, 2002.  The law established a 
temporary federal Terrorism Insurance Program that provides a transparent 
system of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting 
from acts of terrorism to protect consumers by addressing market disruptions and 
ensures the continued widespread availability and affordability of property and 
casualty insurance for terrorism risk.  In addition, it allowed a transitional period 
of three years for the private markets to stabilize, to resume pricing of such 
insurance, and to build capacity to absorb any future losses, while preserving 
state insurance regulation and consumer protections.  The federal government 
undertook 90 percent of the liabilities and made it mandatory for insuring 
agencies to insure against terrorism.  While this has increased the supposed 
safety of the project sites, it has also increased the insurance costs, making it 
difficult for small capital transit investments to raise sufficient amounts to provide 
sufficient insurance levels.  On December 22, 2005, the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Extension Act of 2005 was signed into law and extends the TRIA 
through December 31, 2007. 
Operating insurance costs 
While transit agencies also need insurance for maintaining their fleets, there 
have been high costs in operating insurance as well.  A study conducted by the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation to investigate higher insurance costs, 
concluded the following: 
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1. There is insufficient competition during the procurement process for the 
insurance.  Transit agencies are charged anywhere between 30-45 
percent over the insurance premiums paid by private coaches due to 
insufficient checking process during insurance procurement; 
2.  Transit managers should be more involved in the procurement process; 
3. Specifications for coverage should be improved, and safety engineering 
programs and services provided by insurance agents should be improved; 
and,  
4. Group insurance programs should be investigated. 
 
Among listed reasons, group insurance was given the highest priority.  Following 
the recommendations of the study, 12 districts in Wisconsin agreed to call for 
insurance costs from various companies by recruiting two agencies to quote their 
prices.  When study recommendations were followed, it was found that insurance 
premium costs fell at least 30-45 percent and saved the districts $225,000 
annually. 
Design Issues 
Many transit agencies often pursue ambitious projects that involve setting up 
systems that are unique to the agency.  This increases costs and the complexity 
of the project.  Systems, especially rail, have persisted with the early designs of 
tracks and vehicles to cut down on capital costs.  This affects operational profits 
and reliability in some cases due to poor fuel efficiency, lower speeds etc., but 
this is a trade-off that most transit agencies are willing to take. 
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IMPLICATIONS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
CUTR researchers conducted an exhaustive review of available materials 
concerning costs related to major transit construction projects.  Eight specific 
cases were reviewed to determine what, if any, costs associated with 
construction increased, the reasons for cost escalation/savings, and any 
recommendations offered to improve cost effectiveness in the future. 
 
The eight case studies included projects in the following seven states and one 
project in Puerto Rico: 
 
• Massachusetts – Transportation Authority 
• California – Transit District 
• Washington – Department of Transportation 
• Minnesota – Department of Transportation 
• Utah – Transit Authority 
• Texas – Transit District 
• Nevada – Private Enterprise 
 
The projects were managed or under the jurisdiction of a variety of different 
entities including: 
 
• Transportation Authority (1) 
• Transit Authority (1) 
• Transit District (2) 
• Department of Transportation (3) 
• Private Enterprise (1) 
 
Following is a listing of the nature of the projects: 
 
• Underground Transit Way 
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• Rail System Extension 
• Rapid Rail Line 
• Suspension Bridge 
• Purchase of Federal Land for a Light Rail Transit Line 
• Light Rail System 
• Bus System Improvements 
• Monorail 
 
It is generally accepted that transit agencies have come under intense scrutiny 
for failing to keep their costs under control.  In four of the eight cases, significant 
cost overruns plagued the projects. 
 
• Schedule delays and design modifications caused a 46 percent increase 
of $188 million for an underground transit way that opened four years late. 
 
• Higher-than-expected construction bids including right-of-way costs, utility 
relocation costs, unanticipated mitigations, and third party contracts for 
engineering services were identified as the cause of a 25 percent increase 
of $316.2 million increased cost for an extension of an existing rail system. 
 
• An FTA “turn key” demonstration project, which incorporated contracts to 
design, build, operate, and maintain a rapid rail line, experienced a 34 
percent increase of $42 million. 
 
• The cost of a monorail developed by private enterprise grew from $65 
million in 1997 to a $650 million tax-free bond issue.   
 
Two of the eight cases were negatively impacted by administrative difficulties: 
 
• There was a $53.5 million increase in the federal component of bus 
system improvements due to a two-year delay resulting from a 
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constitutional challenge of the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise 
Program. 
 
• The purchase of federal land for a light rail transit line required the 
construction of two parallel tunnels underneath two active airport runways.  
Property exchange agreements had to be negotiated with five separate 
military services and federal agencies. 
 
One project actually opened early and under budget: 
 
• A Light Rail System, which received a Full Funding Grant Agreement in 
1995, opened in December 1999 rather than on the scheduled date of 
December 2000 at a cost $20 million less than the $312.5 million 
budgeted. 
 
Only one of the eight projects suffered from increased insurance premiums: 
 
• Construction of a suspension bridge that had been planned for 2000 was 
delayed until 2001, after the events of September 11, 2001.  In the interim, 
the cost of insurance and surety bonds increased by $14 million. 
 
Researchers found that insurance costs served as a primary factor in escalating 
the costs of only one of the eight projects, and the escalation appeared to be 
coincidental to the timing of the project, i.e., associated with concerns driven by 
the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. 
 
The research tended to indicate that the rise in insurance costs was being driven 
by the rise in overall project costs resulting from increasing material costs, lack of 
project oversight, and expansion of the original “concept” of the project.  In the 
aftermath of the September 11 incidents in the US, insurance companies were 
unwilling to handle large transit projects due to their susceptibility to possible 
terrorist acts.  A temporary federal Terrorism Insurance Program was created 
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pursuant to legislation to provide shared public and private compensation for 
insured losses resulting from acts of terrorism to protect consumers by 
addressing market disruptions and ensure the continued widespread availability 
and affordability of property and casualty insurance for terrorism risk.  Research 
speculated that the program resulted in increased insurance costs for small 
businesses. 
 
Since surety bonds and performance bonds are based on the “value” of the 
project, as project costs increase, bond costs associated with the project 
increase as well.  Research was void of discussion regarding a disproportionate 
rise in insurance costs.  
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STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES 
 
 Following the literature review, researchers determined that direct discussions 
with stakeholders were necessary not only to explore perceived difficulties with 
insurance and bonding costs; but also, to determine the level of interest in 
participating in a proposed roundtable. The roundtable would afford participants 
the opportunity to discuss firsthand the issues surrounding insurance and 
bonding costs, identify common understandings and solutions and enable FDOT 
to develop a core of industry experts that could be used as future resources. 
 
As researchers embarked on the next phase of the project, they again reviewed 
the project objective, which directed investigation behind the recent rising costs 
in insurance and bonding for transit projects and the identification of ways that 
transit agencies could minimize these costs in their major capital programs.  The 
research team interpreted this FTA directive to mean capital intensive transit 
construction projects which would be primarily projects such as those involving 
rail or bus rapid transit systems. 
 
Following the guidance put forth in the research project description, the 
development of a roster of initial contacts was begun and included 
representatives from FTA, transit agencies, insurance agencies and industry 
associations, bonding agencies and industry associations, contractor 
associations, private consultants/FTA PMOC, and FDOT project manager. 
Additionally, a “Leadership APTA listserve” request was generated through the 
National Transit Research Center at CUTR; the three respondents were added to 
the roster of initial contacts. 
 
Identifying agencies that fit the project criteria, shared commonalities, and were 
willing to take the time to participate in the research project was challenging 
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given the lack of information gleaned from the research and the less than positive 
response from the Leadership APTA listserve request. 
 
Since one of the anticipated outcomes of the project was the utilization of the 
findings to help contain costs related to insurance and bonding for anticipated 
major transit construction projects in Florida over the next five years, FDOT 
encouraged the representation of Florida agencies in the interview process and 
in the roundtable discussion, as appropriate. 
 
In reviewing the transit agencies in Florida, the team found that APTA’s website 
placed Miami Dade Transit, the state’s largest transit agency, in the second tier 
classification: systems having 500 – 999 buses.  Orlando (LYNX) and Pompano 
(Broward County Transit) both placed in the third tier classification: 200 – 499 
buses.  In order to ensure appropriate representation of Florida’s transit agencies 
in the project findings, these agencies (the three largest in Florida) were included 
in the roster of potential project participants. In further support of Florida 
representation, Hillsborough Area Regional Transportation Authority (as a 
respondent to the original listserve request), the South Florida Regional 
Transportation Authority (as the authority responsible for TRI-RAIL), and Miami 
International Airport (due to the amount of intensive capital construction projects 
currently underway or completed in the last several years) were also included.  
 
Heavy rail and bus rapid transit systems are part of Miami-Dade Transit’s 
construction portfolio; however, no other agency in Florida has the same 
experience. Thus, the team continued to look outside of Florida to agencies that 
had implemented or were implementing rail, bus rapid transit systems, or other 
major capital construction projects for participation in the research project. 
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A survey tool was developed to help ensure consistency of questions and to 
assist in keeping the interview geared to project-specific discussion.  A copy of 
the survey tool is included as Attachment A.  
 
As referrals were provided from the first contacts made by researchers, the roster 
was expanded and eventually included 34 potential contacts.  A listing of 
potential interview participants is included as Attachment B.  Of the 34 potential 
contacts, only 21 individuals participated in an in-depth interview or a portion of 
the interview, and 18 individuals were included in the potential roster of 
roundtable participants.  The final roster of potential roundtable discussion 
participants is included in the next section of the report. 
Impact of September 11 
Respondents were provided with a brief overview of the project and objectives.  
Respondents that voiced opinions about the impact of September 11 on the 
costs of risk insurance uniformly agreed that costs did increase after September 
11.  However, the spike in costs was not restricted to any single part of the 
construction industry; costs seemed to level out approximately two years after 
September 11. 
 
Prior to September 11, almost anyone could obtain a bond.  The overall impact of 
September 11 on the economy and the losses and pay-outs associated with 
September 11 changed this practice.  At least three respondents felt that the 
threat of terrorism was still a driver influencing increases in the cost of risk 
insurance, especially in light of more recent terrorist attacks in London and 
Madrid. 
Bonding 
Surety industry representatives were in agreement that increases in costs 
associated with bonding have been slow, steady and significantly less than 
increases seen in overall construction costs. Bonding costs are tied directly to 
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increases in the overall cost of project construction.  It is difficult to separate the 
increases in the cost of bonding due to industry-related drivers from the 
increases in bonding costs due to the overall cost of the construction project, 
since the cost of bonding is a percentage of the actual construction costs. 
 
Increases in bonding cost can be found in projects with marginal contracts that 
are long-term in nature (three to four years), projects with long-term warranties, 
and projects that are very large and/or complex.  The longer the duration of a 
construction project, the higher the risk to the surety company.   
 
Actual premiums are calculated at a rate between 0.5 percent and 2.0 percent of 
the total cost of construction and are, thus, dependent upon the size and 
complexity of the project.  Other factors included in the calculation of bonding 
premiums are the contractor’s financial status, history, and portfolio of work.  
Premiums collected by the bonding industry have increased 8.0 percent to 15.0 
percent.  Surety representatives also indicated that increases in the cost of 
surety bonds are not seen as a factor in escalating construction cost now or in 
the foreseeable future. 
 
Although the surety market has stabilized since September 11, there are still 
some challenges today in securing surety bonds for large construction projects, 
especially projects with anticipated costs of $100 million or more.  In the past, 
there was little difficulty associated with securing bonds for projects; however, in 
today’s world, it is more challenging due to re-insurance companies not 
promoting bonds as freely as they once did. The number of companies issuing 
bonds for projects of $100 million plus has decreased to only one or two. 
 
Respondents indicated that in today’s environment of heavy building 
construction, security companies are scrutinizing contracts and proposals more 
closely. In the past, bond form designs were generally more onerous to the 
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contactor.  However, today, there is a more complicated negotiation process prior 
to developing the bond form and contractors are trying to make the bond forms 
more uniform than the current owner obligees approach. 
 
Although surety bond rates have not increased disproportionately to overall 
increases in the construction industry, other risk insurances have increased 
significantly.  Increases are a reflection of the types of risks covered, primarily 
performance-based versus liability-based. 
Contractor Issues 
Bid packages that are prepared some time before the bid releases often reflect 
the engineer’s estimate of costs at the time of preparation rather than at the time 
of release.  In an effort to ensure that cost escalation incurred between original 
cost estimates and current market prices are covered, contractors often add to 
their submitted cost estimates.  Several respondents suggested that this is seen 
as being more in the environment of doing good business, i.e., covering the costs 
of doing business in the present time rather than padding costs for profit.  
 
The challenges associated with the inconsistency in bid estimates versus present 
time actual costs appears to be more of a problem with public sector bids than 
with private sector bids.  Contractors and subcontractors have asked what can 
be done about this and have identified the need to develop a mechanism that 
better addresses this issue and protects all parties. 
 
Contractors also need to protect themselves from the impact of unanticipated 
increases in cost (i.e., cost of concrete and delays due to lack of skilled workers) 
that are beyond the control of the contractor.  In order to lessen the impact, 
contractors often submit costs that are not the true, actual costs, but rather costs 
adjusted for contingencies and submitted as actual, true costs.  One respondent 
indicated that he believed this to be reflective of current practice; contractors put 
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in contingencies upon contingencies.  Another respondent suggested that this 
occurs as often as eight out of 10 times. 
 
In some cases, contractors face challenges in securing bonds due to the 
individual contractor’s capacity. The contractor’s building portfolio might be at a 
maximum level or near the upper end of total capacity, making it difficult if not 
impossible to obtain bonding support for new projects.  A contractor’s ability to 
handle all the work comes under serious scrutiny.  It is rare that a contractor will 
go under because of one failed project.  Surety bonds are not written to sustain a 
loss as are automobile insurance policies; a bond is given because the surety 
company believes the project will succeed.  Substantial consideration is given to 
whether new contracts will compromise a contractor’s resources and the 
contractor’s ability to support an expanded portfolio of projects.   
 
Simply put, a big driver in increasing construction costs is the never ending issue 
of supply and demand.  There are far too many construction projects and far too 
few skilled workers.  In addition to the demands for construction resources to 
support the current building boom our country is experiencing, the re-building of 
communities that suffered severe damage during the 2004 and 2005 hurricane 
seasons has added to the demands for construction resources.  Global need, 
especially as related to steel and concrete, has added yet another level of 
demand. The escalation of property values plays a big factor in projected 
construction costs.  Soaring real estate prices have become a significant driver in 
the increases associated with major construction projects. 
 
Lack of skilled workers, supplies and materials, difficulties with real estate 
acquisition, and intensive weather conditions result in construction delays and 
contribute to fueling the increases in the overall costs of major capital 
construction projects.  
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Liability Coverage 
When evaluating escalating costs associated with risk insurance, it is important 
to bear in mind that increases in the cost of risk insurances are related to many 
factors and, in some cases, are regionally driven versus nationally influenced.  
This is especially true in coastal communities in Florida, where insurance for 
properties located within one mile of the ocean is extremely difficult to obtain, if it 
can be obtained at all.  Although there has been a slow and steady increase in 
liability coverage, little change was seen last year.  According to one respondent, 
commercial property insurance increased roughly 15 percent over the past few 
years, while personal property/homeowners insurance has increased anywhere 
from 25 percent to 50 percent or more.  
 
One of the primary problems in Florida is the availability of insurance with few to 
no companies willingly to write policies in the state. Costs associated with 
commercial liability insurance are based on many variables, including project 
type and scope, owner or contractor, and location. In Florida, wind insurance is 
required for construction projects and commercial properties.  Currently, the only 
way to obtain this insurance is through the state.  The state just re-opened this 
avenue of insurance in July 2006.  Floridians are experiencing significant 
increases in the cost of homeowner’s and business insurances, forcing some 
residents and businesses to consider moving out of the state. 
 
An article in the September 16, 2006 edition of the Miami Herald: “New State 
Pool to Write Policies” written by Beatrice E. Garcia, stated that a new 
commercial property pool will be established to cover building owners and small 
businesses in Florida. The pool will be operated by the new Commercial Joint 
Underwriting Association (JUA). The article further states that “when the Office of 
Insurance Regulation surveyed businesses this summer, properties valued under 
one million dollars were the ones having the hardest time getting coverage.”  The 
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article also indicted that the JUA might consider writing larger policies in the 
future. 
 
According to an article written by construction law expert Brain G. Friel, Esq. 
entitled: “Risk Management for Construction Projects: Using all the Tools in the 
Toolshed” that appeared in a publication of his firm Greenberg Traurig, the 
importance of appropriate planning to mitigate loss potential is essential. Mr. Friel 
stated that such planning was one of the only ways to help ensure that there was 
a balance between the transaction costs associated with the risk management 
and the need to mitigate exposures. Coordination between legal counsel and 
insurance brokers can be essential in selecting the most appropriate strategy.  
Without proper planning, all available options might not be considered or too 
many might be put in place resulting in overlapping insurances and greater costs.  
Contracting with Government 
One representative from the surety industry commented that while attending a 
meeting in Florida, the issue of FDOT construction bidding was discussed.  The 
question of why there was less bidding on FDOT work versus bidding on private 
sector work was posed to the audience.  Feedback from meeting attendees 
indicated they thought this was due to the private sector work providing a greater 
margin of profit than FDOT work.  Additionally, it was indicated the private sector 
work was seen as having fewer challengers, hassles and less overall frustration 
than work with FDOT or other government entities.  An example of this issue was 
provided and is related to a FDOT road construction design project for a four mile 
stretch of roadway in the Florida Keys.  Apparently, an FDOT engineer released 
the bid for $45 million.  The lowest bid received was for $69 million with the next 
lowest bid $17 million higher. 
 
Other interview participants from the insurance industry also cited the challenges 
and associated problems contactors/sub contractors often face with bid releases 
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based on estimates developed two years prior to the actual bid release.  Once 
again, it was indicated that this happens more often in the public sector rather 
than the private sector. 
Opportunities for Cost Savings 
In support of the findings of the literature review, first hand experience of at least 
one transit organization demonstrated that owner-controlled insurance programs 
or “wrap-up” insurance was an effective mechanism for saving dollars and 
covering all insurance needs. 
 
New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NY MTA) not only saved 
millions of dollars, but also was able to cover insurance needs such as 
construction defects, a category not often funded via traditional insurance.  The 
use of creative “wraps” seems to be the most often discussed and explored 
alternative to reduce insurance costs.  
 
Due to the large size of NY MTA, they were also able to take advantage of the 
benefits of captive insurance, an alternative insurance mechanism, to save even 
more dollars.  With captive insurance, an organization/company creates a stand 
alone entity, generally a subsidiary of the organization, for the purpose of 
insuring all or part of the parent company’s risks.  A captive insurance company 
provides a mechanism for the parent company to take on favorable layers of risk 
and administer their own claims.  However, as an insurance placement tool, few 
transit agencies are able to use captive insurance due to monetary constraints, 
agency size, organizational structure, or other reasons. 
 
During interviews with an APTA representative, researchers were informed that 
over the past few years, the APTA Procurement Committee has conducted 
educational program sessions related in part to the increasing costs of insurance 
and bonding.  The Committee focuses on the relationship of the buyer and seller 
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of services, in this case, the acquiring of bonding and other risk insurances by 
the transit agency.  Hence, they are involved with helping people understand the 
relationship of the buyer and seller in the context of the procurement process.  
Additionally, they present educational sessions on best practices and have 
included information such as graduated bonding amounts, earlier release of 
bonding and creative wraps under the umbrella of best practices. 
Independent Evaluation of Bonding and Insurance 
Through the interview process it was learned that in order to evaluate effectively 
the areas of bonding and insurance, the two topics should be treated and 
reviewed separately, as one is related to liabilities and protection of assets, while 
the other is related to work performance.  At least five of the respondents 
recommended separating bonding and insurance.  The two industries assume 
different types of risk.  Bonding assumes risk related to performance and 
maintenance.  This type of risk is associated with the contractor defaulting, the 
business not surviving the length of the project, and the payment of sub-
contractors.  As a performance-based risk taker, the bonding industry tracks the 
overall increases in the economy in general versus the insurance industry 
tracking index more specifically. 
 
Insurance assumes risks associated with the protection of assets and is linked 
more directly to property damage sustained by wind, hurricanes, acts of nature, 
and terrorism.  As such, the costs have gone up considerably.  In some cases, 
builder’s loss/risk has increased 200 percent or more.  
 
Though both industries are based on the assumption of risk, the insurance 
industry is more vulnerable to threats of terrorism and natural disasters than is 
the bonding industry.  In order to achieve a better understanding of the trends 
related to costs, the challenge of finding insurance companies willing to cover 
new projects and other issues associated with risk insurance, it would be 
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preferable to separate the issues of bonding and insurance and evaluate them 
independently as cost drivers to escalating costs of major capital construction 
projects.  
Transit Agencies 
Of the six transit agencies that participated in interviews, only one indicated that 
the increases in costs associated with insurance and bonding for major capital 
construction projects were perceived as disproportionate to the escalation of 
construction costs overall.  None of the Florida agencies interviewed shared this 
perception nor were they aware of any problems relating to major capital 
construction and contractor capacity. Increases in costs were seen as more 
economic-based, i.e., limited supply of certain materials such as concrete, steel 
and skilled labor creating higher demand and thus higher prices.  
 
Delays due to problems experienced with bid releases increased costs 
significantly for one Florida agency, while cost overruns of between 3 percent 
and 3.5 percent (not related to insurance and bonding costs) were experienced 
by another. 
 
It appears that agencies do not necessarily track the costs of bonding and 
insurance separately, but often include these expenses in the overall 
construction project budget projections.  Providing specific information in 
response to interview questions would necessitate researching archived files, 
which is a time consuming task for already overburdened staff.  One agency did 
experience a seasonal problem when contractors were unable to obtain bonding 
during a particularly problematic hurricane season; however, once the storm 
season was over, the problem was resolved. 
 
One agency was able to share their experiences related to unique applications of 
contracting that involved the first time use of state legislation enacted in an effort 
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to build transportation projects more effectively for a non-road project.  Benefits 
related to securing sufficient levels of bonding by breaking down the project into 
phases, cost savings using CCIP, and other insights were in developing the 
proposal for the third most costly rail proposal in the country. 
Florida Transit Agencies 
Interviews with the largest transit agencies in Florida provided the following 
comments: 
Hillsborough Area Regional Transportation Authority (HART) 
HART uses the mechanism of request for proposal (RFP) for contracting 
construction projects. The RFP incorporates a requirement for a minimum, 
standard amount of risk insurance.  As a self-insured agency, HART has not 
experienced problems securing general liability coverage or any other types of 
insurance coverage.  If there has been a problem with contactors obtaining 
surety bonds, HART is unaware of it.  From a construction perspective, HART 
was unable to identify a problem with increases associated with the costs of 
insurance and bonding for construction projects 
Broward County Transit (BCT) 
BCT experienced a significant increase in the overall cost of one construction 
project that started out as a $2.6 million project and is presently out to bid as a 
$4.3 million project.  The County Purchasing Department re-bid the project 
several times due to problems associated with the bid; the multiple bids and 
associated delays have generated the increase in costs.  Bids are often put out 
with a lump sum estimated cost.  Respondents are expected to factor in all costs 
within the lump sum estimate.  Increases in the cost of surety bonds and other 
risk management insurances are seen as a result of economics in today’s world.  
Construction costs, especially those related to concrete, steel, labor and fuel, 
have increased significantly as a result of supply and demand.  Increases in 
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costs related to insurance and bonding are part of the contractor’s cost of doing 
business and are in response to market forces.  
Miami-Dade Transit (MDT) 
MDT has two construction projects that fit into the category of capital intensive 
construction projects.  The Palmetto Metrorail Extension was completed in 2003, 
and the first segment of the Bus Rapid Transit Project (BRT) was completed in 
2005.  The second segment of the BRT is currently under construction with the 
Notice to Proceed issued in October 2005.  
 
A former MDT staff member was interviewed for the research project and was 
able to provide information related to overall costs and the general breakdown of 
the projects, but was unable to provide a construction insurance-specific 
breakdown of costs for either project. 
 
The Palmetto Metrorail Project was a $91 million project.  The bulk of the costs 
were in the areas of right-of-way acquisition and construction (hard costs 
including labor and materials).  Cost overrun was in the range of 3 percent to 3.5 
percent with approximately $4 million of the overrun associated with claims to the 
civil engineer.  Additionally, MDT found that other county agencies were 
continuing to charge against the project index after May 30, 2003. 
 
The total hard construction cost for both segments of the BRT was approximately 
$73 million.  Total actual costs, including real estate acquisition and 
administration-related costs were approximately $106 million.  There was little 
escalation in costs between segments I and II due to the short length of time 
between the completion of segment I and the start of segment II.  If segment II 
had been implemented later, it is projected that there would have been 
substantial increases in costs associated with materials and labor.  
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The MDT resident engineer for both projects was unable to provide information 
related to the costs of insurance and bonding for either project.  A subsequent 
discussion with the MDT Contract Administration Office provided the following 
information.  The bid release for the Palmetto Extension went out in 1999 and 
construction was completed four to five years ago.  Performance bonds were part 
of the general requirements for construction projects; however, exact costs of 
insurance and bonding would have to be retrieved from old records.  There was 
no recollection about costs related to insurance and bonding being 
disproportionate to overall constructions costs.  
 
Currently, MDT is engaged in no large capital intensive projects.  Approximately 
two years ago there was a brief period when it was difficult to obtain performance 
bonds; however, that was related specifically to the 2004 hurricane season.  The 
writing of bonds was suspended during the hurricane season, but resumed once 
the season was over.  
Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority (LYNX) 
LYNX is currently involved with a construction project for the agency’s new 
operations base that will include facilities for maintenance, storage and re-
fueling.  The operating facilities will be able to store and support 200 or more 
buses, and the support facility will be able to provide support services for up to 
600 buses.  Respondents were unaware of any significant problems in securing 
construction-related insurances or of costs associated with risk insurance being 
disproportionate to overall project costs. 
South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (SFRTA) (TRI-RAIL) 
Through contacts with SFRTA, a request for an interview with appropriate parties 
was generated with several follow-up inquiries.  Referrals to the Engineering & 
Construction Office were made; however, due to the number of critical priorities 
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of this office, representatives were not able to participate in an interview or 
discussions related to the research project. 
Miami International Airport (MIA) 
Because of the number of capital intensive construction in which MIA is involved, 
contacts with MIA personnel were made to determine the level of interest in 
participating in the research project.  Initial inquiries resulted in referrals to Miami-
Dade Aviation Department Risk Management Office.  Several calls were placed, 
contact was made with the office, and an interview appointment was scheduled.  
The interviewee was not available at the time of the appointment.  A positive 
response to subsequent inquiries was not received. 
Out-of-State Transit Agencies 
Dulles Metro Project (Virginia Department of Rail & Public Transportation)  
Due to current and anticipated population growth and increases in the number 
and size of activity centers within the Dulles Corridor, the decision to extend the 
present Metrorail system to serve the Dulles Corridor in Fairfax and Loudoun 
counties was made.  
 
The project is being built by the Virginia Department of Rail & Public 
Transportation in conjunction with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority (WMATA), Fairfax County, Loudoun County, Town of Herndon and the 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA).  The Dulles Corridor Project 
will represent a 23 percent increase in overall size of the Metrorail system.  It is 
the largest transportation project on which the Commonwealth has ever 
embarked and the third most costly rail proposal in the country.  
 
This is the Commonwealth’s first experience of constructing a non-road project 
under the state’s Public/Private Transportation Act. This legislation was 
implemented to build transportation projects cost effectively, faster and to 
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promote private sector investment.  Dulles Transit Partners (DTP) investment 
totals $25 million.   
 
DTP will engineer, design and build the project. Two world-respected engineering 
companies, Washington International Group and Bechtel Corporation, form the 
DTP, which operates as a limited liability corporation.  The project utilizes a 
competitive/negotiated process that differs from a standard design-built bid.  If 
costs run higher than anticipated during the project, the state and the private 
sector company share the risk. 
 
In order to accommodate funding cycles and insurance requirements, the project 
has been segmented into two phases.  The estimated total cost for the project: 
approximately $4 billion. Phase I uses 2006 as the base year for program costs, 
which are projected to be approximately $1.89 billion with about $36 million for 
insurance-related expenditures.  Total Phase I costs, including all expenditures 
(rail cars included) are estimated to be $2.06 billion (estimate based on year of 
expenditure dollars).  Phase I consists of 11.5 rail miles, 6 new stations with 
pedestrian bridges, and 2,300 parking spaces.  Implementation of service for 
Phase I is projected for 2011 with 2012 being somewhat more realistic.  
 
Phase II consists of 11.5 rail miles, 6 new stations with pedestrian bridges at all 
above-ground stations, and 11,550 parking spaces.  Phase II should be ready for 
service in 2015; however, with the change in funding from federal to MWAA, this 
could be earlier.  The initial timeline was based on funding availability rather than 
on construction. 
 
Because only one contractor is being used, it was decided to use CCIP 
(Contractor Controlled Insurance Policy).  The contractor will be reimbursed for 
the cost of CCIP.  Using 2006 as the base year, the estimate of cost is $36 
million for Phase I.  The cost of insurance is also related to the contactor’s safety 
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record.   Additional savings are realized because the overall approach they are 
taking reduces total costs.  
 
FTA requires projects to have 100 percent of bonding in place.  For a project of 
this size and complexity, meeting this requirement would be very difficult.  
However, bonding of the Dulles Corridor is not seen as a problem, since it is 
designed to be constructed in two phases and 100 percent of required bonding 
will be in place at the time of individual phase implementation.  The companies 
that make up the DTP are two of the largest contractors in the world with parent 
company guarantees. 
 
DTP will utilize teams of sub contractors for the project and incorporate a 50 
percent self-performance level.  DTP will be responsible for contractors under 
their bonding.  Without the benefit of having hard data available at the time of 
interview, the respondent indicated that insurance costs do not seem to be a 
significant cost driver. 
 
Thus far, the primary cost drivers for the Dulles Corridor have been related to 
fuel, labor, concrete, and steel.  Because this project uses mainly land that is part 
of public right-of-way versus acquisition of large amounts of new property, a huge 
cost savings was realized.  
 
The respondent commented on the current trend of looking at indexing bids to 
prices such as steel, concrete, and labor.  When a bid is submitted, there would 
be an established value for labor and/or materials and set-points to determine 
who pays what and when.  For example, if the price of steel goes up to an 
agreed upon set-point of a five percent increase, the contractor might be the one 
to absorb the overrun in costs.  If the increase goes up to a set-point of a ten 
percent increase, the cost might be split between the owner and contractor.  
Some bids are utilizing premium labor costing to ensure that the cost of highly 
 
Finding Ways to Reduce Insurance and Bonding Costs 
Final Report, September  2006_________________________________ 
 
 
USF Center for Urban Transportation Research  59
skilled labor, such as steel workers, is sufficiently covered at the onset of the 
project. 
  
As noted by the respondent, construction costs are not flexible.  Efficiencies, 
such as utilizing CCIP, provide savings.  A negotiated process approach can 
provide efficiencies, but the trade off is often loss of control.  
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) 
At the time of interview, BART was getting ready to embark on a $1 billion dollar 
earthquake retrofit project.  Though the project is just getting underway, the 
respondent assumed that cost projections for bonding and insurance were 
disproportionate to overall construction costs; although, no data were provided. 
 
From 1998 through 2003, BART was involved with another major capital 
construction project.  The contractor covered the risk insurance costs and 
included these expenses in the total cost of the project.  Specific cost-related 
information was not readily available. 
 
The respondent indicated that the increases in the cost of insurances 
experienced a few years ago were certainly a result of September 11 and the 
associated losses and pay-outs.  However, the increases in costs seen today are 
not as a result from the threats of terrorism, but from the losses and payouts 
associated with the 2004 and 2005 hurricanes.  Because of the impacts of the 
hurricanes, the insurance market is suffering from lack of capacity.  In California, 
insurance companies are not required to write earthquake insurance, thus, BART 
is retrofitting versus buying insurance. 
  
BART has asked the FTA to wave the 100 percent bonding requirement.  At the 
time of the interview, BART was waiting for an answer to this request.  From the 
respondent’s perspective, this is one of the first actions a transit agency takes 
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when trying to reduce costs associated with bonding, and it seems to be the 
current trend at transit agencies. 
 
BART has not necessarily seen the problem of contractors’ capacity in their large 
scale construction projects; but, has seen this problem in their non-major capital 
work, where contractors have difficulties obtaining bonds due to portfolio 
capacity. 
 
The respondent indicated that TRIA has helped many agencies secure insurance 
for terrorism.  Due to cost, many agencies are either not taking out insurance 
coverage today or they are not getting the same levels of coverage as they once 
were.  There is concern about what will happen when TRIA expires.  It appears 
that the insurance industry has been pushing to allow TRIA to expire.  
 
According to the respondent, some agencies are now opting to be self-insured or 
are assuming a larger portion of coverage through self insurance.  A loss can 
result in less protection in the future, and the full financial impact of the loss has 
to be sustained.  The use of creative wraps is being pursued by agencies such 
as NY MTA.  The use of captive insurance also helps reduce insurance-related 
costs.  California law prohibits the use of captive insurance, so it is not an option 
for BART to consider. It was also noted by the respondent that contracting 
associations are starting to resist wrap-up insurance. 
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ROUNDTABLE 
 
Both the literature review and the interview process support the premise that the 
primary cost drivers to intensive capital transit construction include costs 
associated with labor, materials, fuel, schedule delays, and real estate 
acquisition.  Nonetheless, as challenges such as those associated with 
contractor capacity, more limited promotion of bonds by re-insurance companies, 
and increased intensity of natural disasters, continue to escalate the cost of risk 
insurance, further exploration and open dialogue become a more serious 
consideration in the identification of solutions. 
 
Presenting the body of findings to individuals who participated in the project and 
gleaning first-hand reactions, ideas and suggestions on how to address costs 
and challenges related to risk insurance are important and necessary in order to 
identify ways to help transit agencies in their struggle to meet construction costs 
in a world of constrained budgets and decreasing sources of capital investment 
dollars.  
 
The research and interviews provided the findings; a roundtable provides the 
forum for dialogue and an opportunity to begin to craft solutions.  With an eye to 
the future, those gathered around the table could perhaps develop into an 
effective group or become an ongoing FDOT resource for future discussion and 
solution development.                
Suggested Topics for Roundtable Discussions 
• Consideration of the benefits of independent evaluation of bonding and 
insurance as drivers to the overall escalation of costs related to major 
transit construction projects. 
 
Finding Ways to Reduce Insurance and Bonding Costs 
Final Report, September  2006_________________________________ 
 
 
USF Center for Urban Transportation Research  62
• Dialogue related to the expiration of the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Extension Act scheduled for December 31, 2007 and potential 
consequences to transit agencies upon sunset of the Act.  
• Discussion related to the impacts of intense weather on the costs 
associated with risk insurances. 
• Exploration of  the trends of indexing bids to prices; incorporating set-
points over pre-established values that determine who pays for what 
(owner or contractor) into bids; incorporating premium labor costs into bids 
and discussion related to different types of contracting options that can 
lead to saving project dollars. 
• Discussion focused on different types of wrap-up insurances, e.g., OCIP 
and CCIP. 
• Dialogue directed towards the benefits of careful planning and strategy 
development in choosing risk insurance options and contracting options. 
• Consideration of benefits associated with investment of private sector 
funds into public transit projects. 
Organizing the Roundtable 
Initially the major challenges confronting the roundtable session were selecting 
an agreeable date that did not seriously conflict with summer vacation schedules 
and timing the session so that it in no way precluded completion of the project 
on-time.  Respondents who had expressed interest in attending the conference 
were contacted to find out their current level of interest and to see if the 
timeframe of the last week in August would allow for their participation.  At the 
same time, the contacting of newly identified interview participants continued, 
and invitations to participant in the roundtable were extended to those expressing 
interest in the research project and associated issues. 
 
Given the mix of potential participants, planning for the roundtable moved 
forward with the selection of August 21, 2006 as the date and the Center for 
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Urban Transportation Research (CUTR) at the University of South Florida as the 
host facility. However, as invitations were formally extended, it was learned that 
the representative from Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project had moved to a new 
position in a different agency and would only be able to participate for a specific 
time period via conference call. The president of the Florida Surety Association 
found it necessary to change his time commitment due to an unanticipated client 
related problem; the former director of risk management for the New York 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority was also unable to participate due to 
scheduling conflicts. 
 
Though very interested in attending, the American Insurance Association 
representative was unable to make the necessary adjustments to her schedule to 
participate in the discussion; her attempts to identify and secure an attendance 
commitment of another AIA member were unsuccessful. 
 
After the initial contact with the Third Street Project, responses to invitations to 
participate in an interview and/or roundtable were not received. An offer to 
participate in the roundtable via conference call was extended as part of the 
original invitation. 
 
A BART representative had expressed interest in the roundtable during the 
interview.  Follow-up calls to the formal invitation to participate indicated that the 
individual was looking into attending; however, there was no response to further 
inquiries. As with the Third Street Project an offer to participate in the roundtable 
via conference call was extended. 
 
Interest initially expressed by a representative of the Associated General 
Contractors of America to facilitate member involvement in both the interview and 
roundtable components of the project did not result in demonstrated interest in 
either aspect of the research project. 
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Initial contact with and subsequent invitations extended to the Florida Office of 
Insurance Regulation for participation in the roundtable did not produce a 
response. 
 
As the date of the roundtable drew near, the Florida Surety Association was able 
to identify another board member to participate in the morning session of the 
roundtable.  However, the blend of participants originally envisioned had 
changed to the point of questioning the value of moving ahead with the 
roundtable. 
 
Upon further review of the interviews, the responses to invitations to participate in 
the roundtable, and the lack of demonstrated interest by the transit agencies 
contacted, it was decided to cancel the roundtable.  The mix of those readily 
willing and able to participate was not broad enough to support the goals of the 
roundtable specifically or the project as a whole.  Furthermore, the findings of the 
interviews were consistent with the literature review.  Efforts to conduct a 
roundtable were thus disbanded. 
 
Following is a list of the potential roundtable discussion participants: 
Insurance & Bonding Industries 
• American Insurance Association  
• Florida Security Association (Board Member) and CNA Surety  
• Florida Security Association (President)and the Hartford Group  
• Florida Office of Insurance Regulation  
Florida Transit Agencies & Other Florida Based Organizations 
• Miami-Dade Transit (Formerly with MDT currently with Miami Dade 
County Project Scheduling and Compliance Office of Capital 
Improvements General Obligation Bond Division)  
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• Miami Dade Transit (Contract Administration)  
• Miami Dade Transit Resident Engineer (Palmetto Extension, Busway and 
Metromover Projects)  
• South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (Engineering and 
Construction) 
Out-of-State Transit Agencies 
• Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART)  
• Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project, VA Department Rail & Public 
Transportation  
• New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (formerly with Risk 
Management, currently with Allied North America)  
• Third Street Light Rail Project (MUNI)  
Other Stakeholders – Transportation Consultants, Contractors Association, 
and Professional Organizations 
• Booze Allen Hamilton, Inc./FTA PMOC (Senior Associate)  
• General Contractors of America (Federal and Heavy Construction Division 
& Surety)  
• Federal Transit Administration 
• Florida Department of Transportation  
• Greenberg Traurig (Construction Law) 
• URS Corporation (National Transit) 
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FINDINGS 
 
The findings of the literature review, interviews with transit agencies, and 
stakeholder discussions were consistent.  Although there have been increases in 
the cost of risk insurances associated with major capital construction projects, 
the primary drivers to the escalation of overall increases in costs associated with 
major capital construction projects are related to: labor, concrete, steel, fuel, real 
estate acquisition, delays, and other factors not associated with risk insurance. 
Impact of Terrorism  
Respondents that voiced opinions about the impact of September 11 on the 
costs of risk insurance uniformly agreed that costs did increase after September 
11.  However, costs seemed to level out after approximately two years.  The 
literature review found that the 2002 TRIA and the 2005 TRIA helped to stabilize 
the risk insurance industry, although it is speculated that the program resulted in 
increased insurance costs for small businesses. 
 
In the case study that indicated insurance costs served as a primary factor in 
escalating costs, researchers found that the escalation appeared to be 
coincidental to the timing of the project, i.e., associated with concerns driven by 
the September 11 attacks.  Several respondents expressed concern about the 
consequences of allowing the 2005 TRIA to sunset on December 31, 2007, as is 
now stipulated in the legislation. 
Impact of Natural Disasters 
From the perspective of at least one transit agency from outside of Florida, the 
impact of the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons on the insurance industry was 
not limited to the Gulf Coast area of the country.  The high payouts by re-
insurance companies and the associated reduction in industry capacity to place 
new coverage, have generated significant increases in the cost of premiums and 
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have adversely impacted the ability of the industry to write new polices in other 
areas of the country as well. 
 
In Florida, insurance for properties located within one mile of the ocean is 
extremely difficult to obtain, if it can be obtained at all.  Florida requires 
windstorm insurance for construction and commercial properties, which is only 
available through the state.  The impact of hurricanes and the resultant pay-outs 
by insurance companies have left few companies willing to write policies in 
Florida, making availability a major problem for the state.  Floridians are 
experiencing significant increases in the cost of homeowner’s and business 
insurances, forcing some residents and businesses to consider moving out of the 
state. 
 
However, the Florida transit agencies interviewed were either unaware of any 
issues related to increases in the cost of insurances as drivers to increases in 
overall construction costs for major projects or did not perceive the added costs 
to be significant drivers to the overall costs associated with more increases in 
major construction projects.  One Florida agency did comment on a problem 
involving the difficulty contractors had in securing bonding during the 2004 
hurricane season.  The placement of bonds was suspended until after the close 
of the hurricane season.  
Significant Cost Drivers  
From the perspective of the respondents, concrete, steel and labor seem to be 
the big three in the category of the most significant drivers to the escalation of 
costs associated with increases in overall construction costs of major capital 
projects. In projects that call for real estate acquisition, acquisition costs run a 
neck-to-neck race with the big three as do costs associated with delays in 
construction schedules and procurement of fuel. 
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The national building boom, the re-building of the Gulf Coast, and the global 
demand for concrete, steel, and other construction commodities continue to 
increase costs.  
 
Four of the eight case studies had significant cost overruns, including scheduling 
delays, design modifications, higher-than-expected construction bids, 
unanticipated mitigations, and third party engineering contracts.  Other reasons 
for overruns included a two-year delay due to a constitutional challenge of the 
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program and the purchase of federal land 
for a light rail transit line that required construction of two parallel tunnels 
underneath active airport runaways.  
 
The availability of bonds for high dollar projects ($100 million and up) is limited 
due to the relative lack of promotion of these bonds by re-insurance companies 
and the limited number of companies issuing bonds for high dollar projects. 
 
Bid packages that are prepared some time before actual release are often not 
reflective of current construction costs, such as those associated with skilled 
labor, concrete, steel and fuel. In order to cover these escalations in costs, 
contractors often add to their submitted cost estimates. 
 
One Florida agency saw the costs associated with one project soar from $2.6 
million to $4.3 million due to problems related to the bid process that resulted in 
multiple re-bids and associated delays in final award of the bid.  Increased costs 
were believed to have resulted from several delays.  
 
In order to protect themselves from the impact of unanticipated increases in costs  
beyond the control of the contractor, contractors often submit costs adjusted for 
contingencies rather than true, actual costs. 
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Contractors that are maxed out in terms of their building portfolio can experience 
great difficulty in securing bonds.  In today’s world of heavy building construction 
where there is too much construction and too few workers, contractors can more 
easily reach the upper end of their capacity.  Respondents did not perceive this 
to be much of a problem for contractors bidding on large, complex and costly 
projects; however, several respondents commented that they had knowledge of 
such a problem with contractors bidding on smaller, less complex and less costly 
projects. 
 
Because of the current cycle of heavy building construction, skilled workers are in 
great demand.  Lack of specialty workers can cause delays to projects resulting 
in increased costs to the project.  Additionally, contractors might be required to 
raise pay to attract or maintain skilled workers, further increasing project costs.  
The rebuilding efforts in the areas that incurred storm-related damages during 
the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons coupled with the current cycle of heavy 
building construction adds up to a lack of skilled workers available to meet the 
many current needs of the building industry. 
 
Working with the public sector is often seen as more challenging, frustrating and 
less profitable than working with the private sector.  Responders to bid releases 
sometimes incorporate these aspects into their cost projections, resulting in 
estimates far higher then those reflected in the bid release.  Additionally, the 
issue of bid releases based on estimates of costs at the time of bid preparation 
versus the time of actual bid release (cited by two respondents as often being a 
two-year lag time) seems to be more prevalent in the public sector. 
 
Attempts to secure the involvement of contractors in the research project were 
unsuccessful.   
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Bonding & Insurance 
Careful consideration of all risk management options available is needed to help 
prevent overlap of coverage.  The placement of too much insurance creates a 
burden of additional and possibly unnecessary expenses.  Careful consideration 
of contracting options may lead to more cost effective methods, thereby saving 
agencies substantial dollars. 
 
Some agencies have experienced cost savings through the use of creative 
insurance packages, such as wrap-up insurance, contractor controlled insurance 
and captive insurance.  Additionally, at least one agency anticipates cost savings 
as a result of using a competitive/negotiated process and is taking advantage of 
state legislation that promotes building transportation projects more effectively, 
faster, and encourages private sector investment. 
 
It appears that many transit agencies do not necessarily track the cost of 
insurance and bonding associated with construction projects, especially if these 
costs are incorporated as part of the bid release and/or contract requirements.  
Providing specific information in response to interview questions would generally 
necessitate the researching archives for the specific data.  These are time 
consuming tasks for already burdened staff and are not considered to be 
priorities.  This is especially true in light of perceptions that costs associated with 
insurance and bonding are not primary drivers for increases associated with 
overall costs of major construction projects.  The transit agency resident engineer 
interviewed during the course of the study was unable to provide insurance cost 
data for his agency’s projects. 
 
The costs associated with bonding have been slow, steady and significantly 
lower than increases seen in overall construction costs.  Increases are often 
associated with marginal contracts, long-term projects, projects with long-term 
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warranties or projects that are large and/or complex.  Increases in the cost of 
surety bonds are not seen as a factor in escalating construction cost now or in 
the foreseeable future. 
 
Costs associated with commercial property insurance are calculated based on a 
variety of variables, including but not limited to the location of the project, 
contractor’s safety record, size and scope of the project.  Often the variables are 
regionally-based versus nationally influenced.  Liability insurance is related to the 
protection of assets and assumes a different type of risk than the risks 
associated with bonding.  Commercial property insurance is more vulnerable to 
threats of terrorism and natural disasters, such as those experienced in the 2004 
and 2005 hurricane seasons. 
 
Through the interview process it was learned that in order to evaluate effectively 
the areas of bonding and insurance, the two topics should be treated and 
reviewed separately.  Though both industries are based on the assumption of 
risk, the commercial insurance industry is more vulnerable to threats of terrorism 
and natural disasters than is the bonding industry.  In order to achieve a better 
understanding of the trends related to costs, the challenges of finding insurance 
companies willing to cover new projects and other issues associated with risk 
insurance, it was suggested by at least five respondents to separate the issues of 
bonding and insurance.  Evaluating the insurances independently as cost drivers 
to escalating costs of major capital construction projects would lead to a better 
understanding of issues specific to the industries and perhaps contribute to more 
effective identification of solutions.  
FTA Bonding Requirements 
FTA requires projects to have 100 percent of bonding in place.  Large, complex 
projects often have extreme difficulty meeting this requirement.  Flexibility in 
adjusting this requirement is viewed as important in order to ensure that major 
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capital projects can move forward effectively to meet the needs of the agencies 
and the people served. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS  
Sunset of TRIA 
Currently, TRIA is mandated to sunset on December 31, 2007. Given the 
ongoing threats of terrorist attacks, it is important for transit agencies to 
understand how the determination of TRIA could affect them and how they 
should begin to prepare for such a decision.  Recommendation:  provide 
agencies with status reports focused on developments related to the sunset of 
TRIA.  In the event the forecast is favored for upholding the current legislation, 
with assistance from the appropriate organizations (including the risk insurance 
industry), begin to identify options available to transit agencies for the 
continuation of affordable terrorism insurance coverage; communicate findings to 
agencies well before the projected sunset date. 
Impact of Natural Disasters 
Although Florida transit agencies did not perceive that increases in the costs 
related to bonding and insurance for major transit construction projects were a 
driver in overall increases, the state is experiencing critical problems related to 
the cost and availability of commercial property and liability insurances. 
Increases in costs and the lack of industry capacity to write new policies are 
challenges to transit agencies.  Recommendation:  assist transit agencies in: 
exploring options for reducing costs through the evaluation and assessment of 
benefits and challenges associated with pooling agencies in an effort to reduce 
premiums; establishing criteria for participation in transit insurance pools that 
would help lead to the establishment and sustainability of functional transit 
insurance pools; and, in providing other needed assistance leading to the 
implementation and ongoing effective management of Florida-based transit 
insurance pools. 
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Government-Related Challenges 
The release of bids with cost estimates that are based on estimates projected at 
the time of bid preparation rather than on present-day cost estimates coupled 
with bid inflation due to anticipated time lost in the bureaucratic bid process were 
identified as problems associated with working with the public sector on major 
construction projects.  Recommendation:  work with FDOT and Florida-based 
agencies to isolate specific problems and identify better mechanisms for 
releasing bids that incorporate current cost estimates based on present-day 
projections; conduct roundtable discussions involving participants from the public 
and private sectors in an effort to establish better rapport and identify ways to 
reduce frustration and bureaucratic-based challenges, as well as to identify 
private sector misconceptions and private sector induced challenges and 
frustrations.  
FTA Bonding Requirements 
Several respondents commented on the difficulty of meeting the FTA 
requirement to have 100 percent of bonding in place prior to project 
implementation. This is especially challenging when developing and 
implementing major capital intensive construction projects.  Recommendation:  
survey transit agencies to determine the extent of this problem and the 
mechanisms previously employed to circumvent this challenge, investigate the 
reasons behind the FTA requirement and investigate bonding requirements for 
non-transit capital intensive construction projects, through transit organizations 
and with assistance from and support of the surety industry, identify reasonable 
and viable suggestions for revisions to current FTA requirements. 
Independent Evaluation: Bonding & Insurance 
Though the findings of the research project indicated that the increases in the 
costs related to insurance and bonding for major transit construction projects 
were not disproportionate to the overall increases in the costs of these projects, 
there was the recognition that increases associated with risk insurance impact 
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the bottom line. In order to achieve a better understanding of the trends related to 
costs, the challenges of finding insurance companies willing to cover new 
projects, and other issues associated with risk insurance at least five 
respondents suggested that it would be better to separate the issues of bonding 
and insurance, evaluating them independently from each other and 
independently as cost drivers to escalating costs of major capital construction 
projects.  Recommendation:  develop and conduct independent research 
projects geared to each component of the risk insurance industry involved with 
major transit construction projects. In order to be more Florida inclusive, develop 
research project objectives to incorporate less capital intensive projects as well. 
Obtain feedback from transit agencies, risk industry representatives and others 
with vested interest in major capital construction projects for suggestions related 
to the design, objectives and scope of the projects.  With assistance from FTA, 
FDOT and FTA, identify several transit agencies that would agree to participate 
in the research projects by tracking costs related to insurance and bonding and 
that would agree to provide this information for use in research findings and final 
reports. Since projects are generally several years in duration, initial findings 
could be developed with ongoing submissions and updating of findings related to 
the tracking of risk insurance expenses.  
Benefit from Real-time Experiences: Dulles Metro Project 
The Dulles Metro Project is the largest transportation project on which the 
Commonwealth of Virginia has ever embarked and the third most costly rail 
proposal in the country. At the time of interview, the project had not yet been 
implemented and presented an opportunity for other agencies to learn about the 
benefits and challenges of some of the unique aspects of the project.  The 
project utilizes a competitive/negotiated process which is not the standard 
design-built bid. If costs run higher than anticipated during the project, the state 
and the private sector company share the risk. In order to accommodate funding 
cycles and insurance requirements, the project has been segmented into two 
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phases. It is the Commonwealths’ first experience of constructing a non-road 
project under the state’s Public/Private Transportation Act. This legislation was 
implemented to build transportation projects more cost effectively and faster and 
to promote private sector investment (Dulles Transit Partners investment: $25 
million).  Recommendation:  ongoing communication and status reports related 
to Dulles Metro Project could provide other agencies with an account of real-time 
experiences of one of the largest transit construction projects to be undertaken in 
the country.  Fully understanding the intent behind the Public/Private 
Transportation Act, the benefits envisioned and the experiences of the Dulles 
Metro Project could lead to similar legislation being replicated in other states. At 
a time when there is considerable concern about revenue streams for transit 
construction the promotion of the private sector in the investment of transit 
projects is timely. Additionally, investigating similar legislative initiatives 
implemented in other states could help determine the best legislative model for 
the investment of private sector dollars in transit projects.  Following Dulles Metro 
experiences associated with the use of a CCIP (competitive/negotiated process 
which is not the standard design-built bid) and the use of a shared risk approach 
between the public and private sectors could help other agencies determine if 
there can be a true cost savings utilizing the same or similar approach. 
Reducing Costs  
Between the decrease in federal funding for transit construction, the competition 
of other public-serving departments for state and local funds; the need to comply 
with several federal programs that require additional expenditures, the need for 
existing transit systems to make major repairs and replace rolling stock,  
consideration of how to reduce costs in creative and innovated ways is critical.  
Recommendation:  joining forces with a university-based transportation 
research facility that can bring the resources of a business school, an 
engineering school and their own economic analysis and evaluation skills to the 
table could help FDOT and/or FTA in the identification and design of creative but 
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viable approaches to cost reductions. For example, the collaborative effort could 
explore known cost reduction methods such as indexing bids to be agreed upon, 
clearly established values for labor and/or materials and set-points that 
determine who pays for what and when.  Exploration of such methods could lead 
to the team’s envisioning of variations of the indexing model or the development 
of new models to reduce specific costs, or a combination of costs related to 
major construction projects. 
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Attachment A - Telephone Interview Questions 
 
In order to ensure interview consistency, the following questions will be asked of 
all respondents: 
 
1) What type of major, capital intensive transit construction project have you 
undertaken in the last five years? 
 
2) What were the circumstances under which and environment in which the 
project was built? 
 
3) What was the total cost of the project?  What were the largest cost drivers of 
the project? 
 
4) What was the cost of insurance and bonding? 
 
5) Was the cost of insurance and bonding disproportionate to overall 
construction costs? If so, were there unusual issues related to insurance and 
bonding? 
 
6) Based on your experiences with major transit construction, are costs related 
to bonding and insurance increasing? If so, are the increases independent 
from overall construction costs or as a result of increases in overall 
construction costs? (For example, increase in premiums by Surety Company 
versus increases in amount of total project cost on which premiums is 
calculated?) 
 
7) Has your organization attempted to reduce insurance and bonding costs and 
if so how was this done and what were the results?  
 
8) Could you suggest other organizations and individuals that might be 
interested in participating in this project? 
 
9) Have you written on the subject of insurance and bonding costs for major 
transit construction projects?  Would you be willing to submit this work for 
potential inclusion in the final report? 
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Attachment B - Potential Interview Participants 
Insurance & Bonding Industries & Related Organizations 
• American Insurance Association 
• Florida Contractors Insurance (Construction Insurance Agent) 
• Florida Security Association (Board Member) and CNA Surety 
• Florida Security Association (President)and the Hartford Group  
• Florida Office of Insurance Regulation  
• Surety & Fidelity Association of America (President) 
• Surety Information Office (Executive Director) 
• Zurich North America (Senior Regional VP Construction) 
Florida Transit Agencies & Other Florida Based Organizations 
• Broward County Mass Transit (Construction Project Manager) 
• Broward County Mass Transit (Administration) 
• Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority – Lynx (Operations, 
Maintenance)  
• Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority (Risk Management)  
• Hillsborough Area Regional Transportation Authority (Risk & 
Environmental Safety) 
• Miami-Dade Transit (Formerly with MDT currently with Miami Dade 
County Project Scheduling and Compliance Office of Capital 
Improvements General Obligation Bond Division)  
• Miami Dade Transit (Contract Administration) 
• Miami Dade Transit Resident Engineer (Palmetto Extension, Busway and 
Metromover Projects)  
• Miami International Airport (Civil Environmental Engineering Division) 
• Miami International Airport (Risk Management) 
• South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (Engineering and 
Construction) 
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Out-of-State Transit Agencies 
• Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) 
• Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project, VA Department Rail & Public 
Transportation 
• New York City Transit (Capital Budget) 
• New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (formerly with Risk 
Management, currently with Allied North America) 
• Third Street Light Rail Project (MUNI)  
Other Stakeholders 
(Transportation Consultants, Contractors Association, Professional 
Organizations) 
• American Public Transportation Association (Research & Technology) 
• American Public Transportation Association (Procurement Committee) 
• Booze Allen Hamilton, Inc./FTA PMOC (Senior Associate) 
• Cherokee Enterprises, Inc. (Principal) 
• General Contractors of America (Federal and Heavy Construction Division 
& Surety) 
• Federal Transit Administration 
• Florida Department of Transportation 
• Greenberg Traurig (Construction Law) 
• URS Corporation (National Transit) 
• The Madfis Group (Principal) 
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Attachment C - Recent Industry Developments 
 
1. Recent article entitled, “Hot Button Issues in Construction Accounting & 
Financial Management,” by Robert A. Davidson of Davidson Golden & Lundy, 
CPA’s 
 
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita along with increasing global 
demands, construction supplies are becoming scarce and, therefore, 
more costly.  Two of the six contract management procedures that 
Davidson recommends for contractors are as follows: 
 
“Insurance costs will undoubtedly rise.  Extended period 
contract bids should consider higher insurance costs in labor 
burden rates and other costing components.” 
 
“Now more than ever, obtaining surety bonds for suppliers and 
subcontractors should be a mandatory control procedure.  Due 
to the volatility of supply and price, the bid quote is only as 
good as the subcontractor or supplier.” 
 
Davidson goes on to say that the surety industry reported record losses 
in 2004, with the largest surety reporting a loss ratio of 142 percent and 
almost every major surety reporting losses above acceptable ratios.  
The losses, when coupled with reduced insurance capital available as a 
result of the hurricanes, will tighten surety credit in 2006. 
 
Davidson suggested that contractors schedule annual meetings with 
their financial partners, improve financial reporting, clean up financial 
statements and cease all unhealthy practices, and bid jobs that are a 
good match. 
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2. Recent article in the May 12, 2006 Daily Journal of Commerce: “SBA bond 
changes to effect Gulf contractors,” by Garry Boulard. 
 
“…. the U.S. Small Business Administration has 
announced plans to significantly streamline the 
application process of its Surety Bond Guarantee 
Program.  A bedrock of the SBA since its creation in 
1971, the Surety Bond Guarantee Program guarantees 
for small construction companies bid, payment and 
performance bonds of up to $2 million.  Among the 
changes announced by SBA Administrator Hector V. 
Barreto is how the agency defines what a small business 
is.  If a business meets the North American Industry 
Classification System size standard within the industry in 
which it is working, or if the business does not make more 
than $6.5 million yearly in gross receipts, the SBA now 
considers it as a small business.  The new designation 
applies only to those businesses that are doing work in an 
officially declared disaster area in either Mississippi or 
Louisiana.” 
 
3. Recent article in May 12, 2006 Buffalo Business First: “New law (in Maryland) 
allows contractors to use individual surety bonds,” by Rachel Sams 
 
“The bill, which Ehrlich (Maryland Governor) signed into 
law May 2, allows contractors to submit individual surety 
bonds for state work.  Supporters believe it will help small 
and minority contractors … get the backing they need to 
land state projects.  But the laws opponents say it could 
wallop small subcontractors and construction suppliers.  A 
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surety bond guarantees that a contractor will complete a 
project and pay subcontractors and suppliers.  All state 
projects costing more than $100,000 require a bond, as 
do some smaller projects.  Maryland previously only 
accepted surety bonds issued by insurance companies.” 
4. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Construction 
Industry Executive Forum, July 20-21, 2006, San Diego, California: 
 
Friday, July 21 – “Challenges: Insurance Risk Management and 
the Surety Bond Market,” Mike O’Neill, American Construction 
Insurance Group, Inc., Dallas, Texas 
 
Highlights of the session include:  captive insurance 
markets; OCIPs and CCIPs; subcontractor default 
insurance; current surety issues; and alternative 
programs – captive/deductibles. 
 
Finding Ways to Reduce Insurance and Bonding Costs 
Final Report, September  2006_________________________________ 
 
 
USF Center for Urban Transportation Research  84
References 
 
1) Phyllis F. Scheinberg, Challenges in Evaluating, Overseeing, and Funding 
Major Transit Projects, A Testimony for the US General Accounting Office, 
March 2000. 
2) Financial Capital Investment: A Primer for the Transit Practitioner, Transit 
Cooperative Research Program, Transportation Research Board, TCRP 
Report 89, sponsored by the Federal Transit Administration, 2003. 
3) Citizens Budget Commission, New York’s Endangered Future: Debt 
Beyond Our Means, September 2005. 
4) William Streeter and Scott Trommer. Transit New Starts: The Promise and 
Perils of Full Funding Grant Agreements, Project Finance Special Report, 
FITCH, April 20, 2001. 
5) Virtuosity Consulting, Final Report: Successful Examples of Public-Private 
Partnerships and Private Sector Involvement in Transport Infrastructure 
Development, Under Contract with the OECD/ECMT Transport Research 
Centre, May 28, 2005. 
6) Steve Lockwood, The Dynamic State of Transportation Finance, A white 
paper for participants of the 2005 James L. Oberstar Forum, The Future of 
Transportation Finance: ‘Gas Tax Plus’ and Beyond, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, April 17-18, 2005. 
7) Wisconsin DOT Saves on Transit Insurance, in the Research Pays Off, 
Transportation Research Board, Vol. No.110, Jan-Feb 1984, pp 4-5. 
8) Rick Thoms, Helping You Acquire the Products and Services Your 
Community Needs, For the Transportation Lending Services Corporation. 
9)  KCI. Technologies Inc. Current Practices in Public- Private Partnerships 
for Highways, prepared in partnership with the Maryland Transportation 
Authority, Maryland DOT, and the Maryland State Highway Administration, 
May 2005. 
 
Finding Ways to Reduce Insurance and Bonding Costs 
Final Report, September  2006_________________________________ 
 
 
USF Center for Urban Transportation Research  85
10) Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority, Sound Move Regional 
Transit Projects, Owner Controlled Insurance Program, 11th December, 
2004. 
11) Roger F. Johnson, William Streeter, and Joseph Mason. State of Nevada, 
Department of Business and Industry, Las Vegas Monorail Co., Inc., in 
Finance, FITCH Report, September 8th, 2000. 
12) Christopher Jenks. Availability and Accessibility Of Liability And Excess 
Insurance For Public Transit And Private Coach Operators. In the 
Research Results Digest 295, National Cooperative Highway Research 
Program, May 2005. 
13) Victor S. Romero and John M. Stolz, Jacobs Associates, San Francisco, 
CA, Cost Estimating For Underground Transit: Too Dangerous To 
“Guesstimate”, The Capital Projects Process. 
14) Don Irwin, Developing the Design and Construction Contracting Plan for a 
Major Light Rail Extension Project, Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation 
District of Oregon, in the Transportation Research Circular, 9th Light Rail 
Transit Conference Proceedings, November 2003, pp 557-575.  
15) Monica Born and Christopher Burner, Design-Build Contracts: Lessons 
Learned on the Gold Line Rail Project for APTA, in the Transportation 
Research Circular, 9th Light Rail Transit Conference Proceedings, 
November 2003, pp 576- 584. 
16) Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K. Skamris Holm and Soren L. Buhl. Department of 
Development and Planning, Aalborg University, How Common and How 
Large are Cost Overruns in Transport Infrastructure Projects?, in 
Transport Reviews, 2003, Vol. 23, No 1, pp 71-88. 
17) Bent Flyvbjerg. Policy and Planning for Large Infrastructure Projects: 
Problems, Causes, Cures, in World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
3781, December 2005. 
 
Finding Ways to Reduce Insurance and Bonding Costs 
Final Report, September  2006_________________________________ 
 
 
USF Center for Urban Transportation Research  86
18) Robert Paaswell, Todd Goldman, Mark Seaman, Ellen Thorson, and 
Cameron Gordon, Analysis of Capital Cost Elements and Their Effect on 
Operating Costs, Final Report, November 2005, USDOT/FTA.  
 
